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Wrongful Birth: False Representations of
Women's Reproductive Lives*
Shelley A. Ryan**
Despite tremendous medical advances in recent years,
many children are born with birth defects. In some cases, physi-
cians or other medical professionals can help parents, if they so
choose, avoid the birth of an impaired child. When medical pro-
fessionals fail to help parents make that choice, tort law now
provides a remedy. Nearly half of the states recognize a cause of
action for "wrongful birth."'
* Copyright 1994, Shelley A. Ryan and Minnesota Law Review.
** Visiting Associate Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma Law
Center. LL.M. 1993, Harvard Law School; J.D. 1987, Washburn University
School of Law. This Article was made possible in part by a grant from the
American Association of University Women Education Foundation.
I am grateful to many individuals for their assistance with this Article. A
special thank you goes to Martha Field for her input and encouragement
throughout the development of this Article. Myrl Duncan, Jalen O'Neil, and
Shirley Wiegand reviewed earlier versions of this Article and provided helpful
feedback. Thomas Crawford, J.D. 1993, Washburn University School of Law,
and Elisabeth Sperow, J.D. 1995 (expected), University of Oklahoma Law
Center, provided valuable research assistance. My eternal gratitude goes to my
colleagues on the faculty at Washburn University School of Law who partici-
pated in the Feminist Jurisprudence seminar during the fall 1990 semester;
you helped me discover within myself an exciting and enlightening approach to
the law. Finally and most importantly, I dedicate this article to Dr. Terry J.
Meier, for devotion and support beyond all measure; and to our unborn child;
may you be healthy and happy.
1. Keel v. Banach, 624 So. 2d 1022 (Ala. 1993); Lininger v. Eisenbaum,
764 P.2d 1202 (Colo. 1988) (en banc); Garrison v. Medical Ctr. of Del., Inc., 581
A.2d 288 (Del. 1989) (en banc); Haymon v. Wilkerson, 535 A.2d 880 (D.C. 1987);
Fassoulas v. Ramey, 450 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1984) (per curiam); Goldberg v. Rus-
kin, 499 N.E.2d 406 (Ill. 1986); Arche v. United States, 798 P.2d 477 (Kan.
1990); Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 530 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1988); Reed v.
Campagnolo, 630 A.2d 1145 (Md. 1993); Viccaro v. Milunsky, 551 N.E.2d 8
(Mass. 1990); Proffitt v. Bartolo, 412 N.W.2d 232 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987); Smith
v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341 (N.H. 1986); Schroeder v. Perkel, 432 A.2d 834 (N.J.
1981); Bani-Esraili v. Lerman, 505 N.E.2d 947 (N.Y. 1987) (mem.); Flanagan v.
Williams, 623 N.E.2d 185 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d
846 (Tex. 1975); Naccash v. Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825 (Va. 1982); Harbeson v.
Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983) (en banc); James G. v. Caserta,
332 S.E.2d 872 (W. Va. 1985); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372
(Wis. 1975).
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The road toward full recognition of the claim has been
rocky, however. Several courts have refused to recognize a
cause of action for wrongful birth; they reason that the claim
does not satisfy traditional tort requirements. 2 Even among ju-
risdictions that recognize the cause of action, courts have not
reached agreement on the appropriate measure of damages.3
This Article demonstrates that much of the trouble plaguing
the wrongful birth claim stems from reliance by courts and legis-
latures on male norms under particularly inappropriate circum-
stances. Courts have judged pregnancy, motherhood, and
abortion by male standards,4 even though each of these exper-
iences is a uniquely female one. The result has been confusion,
distortion, and misrepresentation of women's experiences.5 Part
I of the Article explains the tort of wrongful birth and clarifies
the feminist method this Article utilizes to reveal the male
norms underlying the law of wrongful birth. Part II explains
how courts have decided whether parents in wrongful birth
cases should recover for their own emotional harm and illus-
trates that courts have applied male norms to answer this ques-
tion. Part III demonstrates how courts and legislatures have
One federal court, in the absence of a decision of the state's highest court,
has recognized the cause of action. See Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp.
544 (D.S.C. 1981) (applying South Carolina law). Two other state courts seem
to have recognized the cause of action, but have not addressed the issue di-
rectly. See Walker v. Mart, 790 P.2d 735 (Ariz. 1990) (en banc); Andalon v.
Superior Court, 208 Cal. Rptr. 899 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
2. See, e.g., Atlanta Obstetrics & Gynecology Group v. Abelson, 398 S.E.2d
557 (Ga. 1990); Wilson v. Kuenzi, 751 S.W.2d 741 (Mo. 1988) (en banc); Azzolino
v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528 (N.C. 1985).
3. In some cases, courts have allowed plaintiffs to recover for their emo-
tional harm. See, e.g., Keel v. Banach, 624 So. 2d 1022 (Ala. 1993); Andalon v.
Superior Court, 208 Cal. Rptr. 899 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Viccaro v. Milunsky,
551 N.E.2d 8 (Mass. 1990); Eisbrenner v. Stanley, 308 N.W.2d 209 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1981); Schroeder v. Perkel, 432 A.2d 834 (N.J. 1981); Berman v. Allan, 404
A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983)
(en banc).
In other cases, courts have not allowed plaintiffs to recover for their emo-
tional harm. See, e.g., Garrison v. Medical Ctr. of Del., Inc., 581 A.2d 288 (Del.
1989) (en banc); Moores v. Lucas, 405 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981);
Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 512 N.E.2d 691 (IlM. 1987); Arche v. United
States, 798 P.2d 477 (Kan. 1990); Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 530 So. 2d
1151 (La. 1988); Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341 (N.H. 1986); Becker v. Schwartz,
386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978); Howard v. Lecher, 366 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1977); Ja-
cobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975).
4. See, e.g., Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: The Case of Preg-
nancy, 1 BERKELEY WoMEN's L.J. 1 (1985) (providing feminist critique of tradi-
tional treatment of pregnancy by courts and legislatures).
5. See infra notes 132-169, 203-236 and accompanying text.
858
WRONGFUL BIRTH
dealt with the issue of causation in wrongful birth cases and
shows that a resort to male norms again has infected the law.
The Article concludes that by resorting to female norms which
more accurately represent the circumstances of the wrongful
birth case, courts and legislatures can overcome the difficulties
they have had reaching consensus on the issues of emotional
harm damages and causation in wrongful birth cases.
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF WRONGFUL BIRTH
A. EvOLUTION OF THE WRONGFUL BIRTH CLAIM
A "wrongful birth" claim is a medical malpractice action in
which the parents of an impaired child allege their physician
negligently failed to provide them with information that would
have helped them avoid the birth of that child.6 Usually, the
negligence takes one of two forms. One type of case arises when,
in violation of established medical practices, the physician fails
to recommend tests for determining whether a couple is at risk
for conceiving a child with birth defects.7 Because the couple
does not know they are at risk, they conceive a child who is born
with impairments. They claim that had the physician exercised
due care, they would not have conceived the child in question.8
In the second type of claim, a physician fails, despite established
medical practices, to recommend prenatal testing for a couple
that already has conceived a child.9 The parents allege that had
the physician exercised due care, they would have learned that
their fetus was carrying a birth defect and they would have ter-
minated the pregnancy.10
Before the Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade,1 ' no state
or federal court in the United States recognized the tort of
6. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAV OF TORTS
§ 55, at 370-73 (5th ed. 1984). The reader should distinguish a wrongful birth
claim from two other types of tort claims with which it is often confused. A
"wrongful life" claim is similar to a wrongful birth claim, but is brought by the
child born with impairments; wrongful birth claims are those of the parents of
the impaired child. Id. Wrongful life claims have found little support among
the courts that have addressed the tort. Id. "Wrongful pregnancy" or "wrongful
conception" claims are those brought by parents who, because of a physician's
negligence, have given birth to a healthy but unwanted child. Id. The claims
usually arise when a physician has been negligent in performing a sterilization
procedure. These claims have received more support in the courts. Id.
7. Id. § 55, at 370-71.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
1994] 859
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wrongful birth. In a typical pre-Roe decision, the New Jersey
Supreme Court, in Gleitman v. Cosgrove,12 refused to recognize
the tort, in part because "substantial public policy reasons" pre-
cluded the court from awarding damages "for the denial of the
opportunity to take an embryonic life."13 After Roe, some courts
began to address the delicate question of whether tort law
should provide compensation to a woman denied the opportunity
to abort a fetus. Tremendous advances in the detection of birth
defects made more women aware of the risks, and Roe allowed
them to take action against those risks.
The Texas Supreme Court was the first court in the country
to allow a cause of action for wrongful birth. In Jacobs v.
Theimer,14 the plaintiff mother became ill early in her preg-
nancy and she claimed her physician was negligent in failing to
properly diagnose her illness as rubella.15 After her child was
born with a heart defect, 16 she and her husband sued her physi-
cian.17 The court agreed to recognize a cause of action for
wrongful birth' 8 despite the fact that at the time of the plain-
tiffs pregnancy, 1968, she could not have obtained a legal abor-
tion in the state.' 9 The court acknowledged that the plaintiff
could have obtained a legal abortion elsewhere, 20 and so con-
cluded, as the Roe court had two years earlier,21 that the deci-
sion was one to be made by the parents alone.22
Twelve years after deciding Gleitman,23 the New Jersey
Supreme Court cited Roe in support of its conclusion that public
policy had changed and courts should recognize the tort of
12. 227 A.2d 689 (N.J. 1967), overruled by Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8
(N.J. 1979).
13. Id. at 693.
14. 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975).
15. Id. at 847.
16. Children whose mothers contract rubella early in their pregnancies
commonly suffer from "congenital rubella syndrome," which is characterized by
severe birth defects, including congenital heart disease, mental handicap, eye
cataracts, and deafness. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO MEDICINE 1284 (1986)
[hereinafter OxFoRD's].
17. Jacobs, 519 S.W.2d at 847.
18. Id. at 850.
19. Id. at 847.
20. Id. at 848.
21. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
22. Jacobs, 519 S.W.2d at 848.
23. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689 (N.J. 1967), overruled by Berman
v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979).
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wrongful birth.24 In Berman v. Allan,25 the court explained its
shift:
In light of changes in the law which have occurred in the 12 years since
Gleitman was decided, the... ground relied upon by the Gleitman
majority can no longer stand in the way of judicial recognition of a
cause of action founded upon wrongful birth. The Supreme Court's rul-
ing in Roe v. Wade... clearly establishes that a woman possesses a
constitutional right to decide whether her fetus should be aborted, at
least during the first trimester of pregnancy. Public policy now sup-
ports, rather than militates against, the proposition that she not be
impermissibly denied a meaningful opportunity to make that
decision. 2
6
The court emphasized that any other result would immunize
negligent doctors "providing inadequate guidance to persons
who would choose to exercise their constitutional right to abort
fetuses which, if born, would suffer from genetic defects." 27
At least twenty states now recognize a cause of action for
wrongful birth.28 Despite this growing acceptance of the cause
of action, courts have not reached agreement on two important
issues surrounding the claim. The first disputed issue is
whether plaintiffs should recover damages for emotional harm
they suffer because of the physician's negligence and the result-
ing impairment of their child. Courts do not agree whether to
allow recovery for emotional harm damages, 29 nor do they apply
a consistent rationale to justify their conclusions.30
24. Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979). The child in Berman was born
with Down's Syndrome. Id. at 10. The plaintiffs claimed that accepted medical
practice dictated that the mother's physician recommend an amniocentesis dur-
ing the pregnancy, and that the amniocentesis would have revealed that the
fetus was afflicted with Down's Syndrome. Id.
Amniocentesis is the percutaneous transabdominal puncture of the uterus
to obtain amniotic fluid in order to test for genetic defects. OXFORD's, supra
note 16, at 41. Down's Syndrome is defined as follows:
[A] chromosome disorder characterized by a small, anteroposteriorly
flattened skull, short, flat-bridge nose, epicanthal fold, short phalan-
ges, widened spaces between the first and second digits of hands and
feet, and moderate to severe mental retardation, with Alzheimer's dis-
ease developing in the fourth or fifth decade. The chromosomal aberra-
tion is trisomy of chromosome 21 associated with late maternal age.
Id. at 325.
25. 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979).
26. Id. at 14.
27. Id. (citations omitted).
28. See supra note 1 (listing jurisdictions that recognize the wrongful birth
cause of action).
29. See supra note 3 (noting disagreement among courts over recovery of
emotional harm damages).
30. Courts have used at least three different tort theories to disallow dam-
ages for emotional harm. See, e.g., Moores v. Lucas, 405 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. Dist.
1994]
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The second issue plaguing the area of wrongful birth law is
the issue of causation. So far, courts have held that in order to
prove causation, plaintiffs must show that in the absence of the
defendants' negligence, they would not have suffered the dam-
ages for which they seek recovery. 31 When plaintiffs claim the
defendant failed to diagnose an impairment during pregnancy,
courts have required them to demonstrate that if the defendant
had not been negligent, they would have chosen to undergo test-
ing, learned of the child's impairment, and terminated the preg-
nancy.32 The causation requirement has disturbed state
legislatures; several states have addressed the causation re-
quirement by passing legislation restricting certain actions for
wrongful birth.33
B. EXPOSING THE FALSE REPRESENTATIONS OF WoMEN'S
REPRODUCTIVE LIVES
This Article incorporates the method of inquiry proposed by
legal scholars who suggest we must look behind the supposedly
"neutral" rules of the law to discover the gender-based assump-
tions that underlie these rules. These scholars suggest that too
often, courts develop "objective" rules from a collection of male
Ct. App. 1981) (applying the "impact" doctrine); Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen.
Hosp., 512 N.E.2d 691 (Ill. 1987) (applying bystander rules); Becker v.
Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978) (applying the "benefit/burden" rule).
31. See, e.g., Haymon v. Wilkerson, 535 A.2d 880, 882 (D.C. 1987) (holding
that plaintiff must establish, as an element of her claim, that had she learned of
the impairment during her pregnancy, she would have terminated the preg-
nancy); Proffitt v. Bartolo, 412 N.W.2d 232, 237 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (holding
that plaintiff satisfies the causation element by showing that she would have
obtained an abortion in the absence of defendants negligence); Smith v. Cote,
513 A.2d 341, 345, 347 (N.H. 1986) (holding that the chain of causation is not
too remote where plaintiffs claim they would have aborted the fetus had they
learned of the impairment).
32. See supra note 31.
33. See IDAHO CODE § 5-334(1) (1992) ("A cause of action shall not arise,
and damages shall not be awarded, on behalf of any person, based on the claim
that but for the act or omission of another, a person would not have been per-
mitted to have been born alive but would have been aborted."); MINN. STAT.
§ 145.424, subd. 2 (1992) (prohibiting cause of action "on the claim that but for
the negligent conduct of another, a child would have been aborted"); Mo. REv.
STAT. § 188.130(2) (1986) (prohibiting cause of action "on the claim that but for
the negligent conduct of another, a child would have been aborted"); PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 8305(a) (1988) (prohibiting cause of action on the claim that "but
for an act or omission of the defendant, a person once conceived would not or
should not have been born"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-24 (1983) (prohibiting
cause of action based on allegation "that but for the act or omission of another, a
person would not have been permitted to have been born alive but would have
been aborted").
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perspectives. 34 The goal of feminist method is to point out
where the law assumes a male perspective-one which is neces-
sarily incomplete-in formulating and applying rules which
courts then present as objective and gender-neutral.35 Failure
to attempt this process only perpetuates the male dominance of
our legal system.36
Feminist method has demonstrated that for too long, an
obvious male perspective has infected the law in areas such as
employment discrimination, 37 rape,38 self-defense,39 and por-
nography.40 Similarly, feminist method has revealed gender-
bias in those areas of the law in which it might not be as obvi-
ous. 4 i Several feminist theorists have pointed out gender-bias
34. See Lucinda Finley, A Break in the Silence: Including Women's Issues
in a Torts Course, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 41, 41-42 (1989).
35. Clare Dalton, Where We Stand: Observations on the Situation of Femi-
nist Legal Thought, 3 BERKELEY WoME's L.J. 1, 6-7 (1987-88). Dalton makes
the following argument:
Women have long, if not always, held the suspicion, if not the knowl-
edge, that what passed for point-of-view-less-ness was in fact His point
of view.... Feminist epistemology starts from the premise that what
has been presented as "the world" and "the truth" has obscured wo-
men's reality, and ignored women's perspective. It contains the explo-
sive suggestion that what have passed as necessary, universal and
ahistorical truths have never been more than partial and socio-histori-
cally situated versions of truth.
Id. at 6 (footnote omitted).
36. Heather Ruth Wishik best articulates the point: "To fail to make in-
quiries about law that are inclusive of the point of view of women's experiences
is to support patriarchy." Heather Ruth Wishik, To Question Everything: The
Inquiries of Feminist Jurisprudence, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN's L.J. 64, 68 (1985).
37. See, e.g., CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF
WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEx DISCRIINATION (1979) (arguing that sexual
harassment constitutes unlawful discrimination).
38. See, e.g., SusAN ESTRIcH, REAL RAPE (1987) (criticizing traditional rape
law).
39. See, e.g., SUSAN SCHECHTER, WoMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS
AND STRUGGLES OF THE BATTERED WoMEN'S MovEMENT (1982) (examining the
issues affecting battered women from a feminist perspective).
40. See, e.g., ANDREA DwomN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN
(1989) (arguing that pornography victimizes women).
41. See, e.g., Hilary Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to Interna-
tional Law, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 613 (1991) (illustrating that international law is
not objective or gender neutral); Marion Crain, Images of Power in Labor Law:
A Feminist Deconstruction, 33 B.C. L. REv. 481 (1992) (criticizing the patriar-
chal vision of power embodied in labor law); Mary Joe Frug, Rescuing Impossi-
bility Doctrine: A Postmodern Feminist Analysis of Contract Law, 140 U. PA. L.
REv. 1029 (1992) (exploring the consequences of male bias in contract law); Kit
Kinports, Evidence Engendered, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 413 (arguing that the cur-
rent rules of evidence are grounded in male norms of formality, abstraction, and
complexity); Deborah Maranville, Feminist Theory and Legal Practice: A Case
Study on Unemployment Compensation Benefits and the Male Norm, 43 HAS-
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in the seemingly innocuous law of tort.42 It is especially from
their work that this Article takes its cue.
Heather Ruth Wishik has set out a multi-step process by
which one can analyze and critique the presence of the male per-
spective in the law.43 Her seven-step inquiry incorporates the
following questions:44
1) What are women's experiences regarding the "life situation" ad-
dressed by the law in question?
2) What assumptions or descriptions does the law make in this
area?
3) How do these assumptions or descriptions distort or deny wo-
men's experiences?
4) What patriarchal interests are served by the distortion or de-
nial of women's experiences?
5) How can the law be reformed, and how will these reforms affect
the lives of women?
6) Ideally, what would women's experiences be?
7) How do we get there from here?45
TINGS L.J. 1081 (1992) (showing how insights from feminist theory could assist
a legal challenge to a denial of benefits); Patricia A. Tidwell & Peter Linzer, The
Flesh-Colored Band Aid-Contracts, Feminism, Dialogue, and Norms, 28 Hous.
L. REv. 791 (1991) (illustrating that a relational view of contracts is grounded
in a female norm).
42. See, e.g., Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re)Torts: Thoughts on the Liability
Crisis, Mass Torts, Power, and Responsibilities, 1990 DuKE L.J. 848; Leslie
Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3
(1988) [hereinafter Bender, Lawyer's Primer]; Finley, supra note 34. For a thor-
ough listing of writings by feminist theorists in tort law, see Leslie Bender, An
Overview of Feminist Torts Scholarship, 78 CoRNELL L. RIv. 575 (1993). The
gendered nature of wrongful birth law may be more apparent at first glance
than other issues within tort law.
43. See Wishik, supra note 36, at 72-77.
44. The indented questions paraphrase the elements of Wishik's seven-step
inquiry. They are not direct quotations from Wishik's article.
45. Wishik, supra note 36, at 72-77. Some feminist theorists assert that a
simple attempt to "clean up" existing legal doctrines so that they include wo-
men's perspective, without more, will simply perpetuate and legitimate the pa-
triarchy. See, e.g., Diane Polan, Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy, in
THE PoLrrIcs OF LAw 294 (D. Kalrys ed., 1982). While efforts at law reform
may be incomplete, they are nonetheless valuable. See Christine A. Littleton,
In Search of a Feminist Jurisprudence, 10 HRv. WomEN's L.J. 1, 4-5 (1987).
Law reform can immediately affect the lives of real women in a profound
way. For instance, the reforms I suggest would enable more women to provide
adequate care to their impaired children and would legitimate women's emo-
tional suffering in these circumstances. See infra text accompanying notes 173-
180 & 241-253. In addition, even if courts and legislatures do not adopt them,
reform suggestions can effectively point out the "hypocrisy" of the legal system.
See infra text accompanying notes 174-177. This Article's critique regarding
recovery of damages for emotional harm demonstrates the law's inconsistencies
in this area and its tendency to devalue emotional harm.
864 [Vol. 78:857
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This Article's critique of wrongful birth law will follow Wishik's
suggestions and address each of her inquiries.
4 6
II. ASSESSING CLAIMS FOR EMOTIONAL HARM
DAMAGES IN WRONGFUL BIRTH CASES
Most courts that have addressed the wrongful birth cause of
action have agreed to recognize it. 47 These courts, however,
have not agreed on the measure of damages to be awarded in
46. I will temper my analysis with a concern that feminist method not at-
tempt to replace one set of truths with another. Feminist theorists argue that
what appears to be objective is imbued with the male perspective, and that this
perspective is limiting and incomplete. See Dalton, supra note 35, at 6. Femi-
nists must not fall into the same "trap" of asserting that our truths are "the
truth." "[A] feminist narrative or theory should not imagine itself as replacing
(but only as displacing) a male or masculinist one-how could feminists' situ-
ated claims to authority become absolute ones?" Id. at 7. The power of feminist
method is its ability to show that the appearance of a single objective viewpoint
or truth is misleading. Accordingly, I will attempt to offer an additional per-
spective without asserting that I have discovered a new objectivity. Nonethe-
less, the addition of a female norm in the wrongful birth context is a substantial
improvement over the use of a male norm, because the circumstances at issue
in a wrongful birth case include experiences unique to women: pregnancy and
childbirth, motherhood, and abortion.
Because feminist theorists adhere to the view that all perspectives are in-
complete, feminist writers also must not assume that they can represent the
perspectives of all women. "[N]o single feminist narrative or theory should im-
agine that it can speak univocally for all women." Id. at 7; see Martha Minow,
Feminist Reason: Getting It and Losing It, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 47 (1988) (argu-
ing that feminist theorists risk treating their own experiences as universal
without regard for differences among women which might vary on the basis of
class, race, religion, ethnicity, nationality, and other situations). Catherine
MacKinnon defines the feminist question as one which searches for the point of
view of all women and acknowledges variations in viewpoint among women of
different classes, ages, races, religions, and sexual orientations. Catherine A.
MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Ju-
risprudence, 8 SIGNs 635 (1983). "This feminism seeks to define and pursue
women's interest as the fate of all women bound together. It seeks to extract
the truth of women's commonalities out of the lie that all women are the same."
Id. at 639-40 n.8.
Thus, I have attempted in this Article to remain aware of differences
among women. For instance, I recognize that the cause of action for wrongful
birth assumes a world in which all pregnant women have access to some prena-
tal care, an assumption which simply does not hold true for poor women. This
Article certainly will omit other important perspectives of women. The point of
view of any woman, however, is currently missing from the law of wrongful
birth, and this Article's observations and suggestions for a female perspective,
especially those relating to damages, are not dependent on any particular ra-
cial, cultural, religious, or class perspective.
47. See supra note 1 (citing cases allowing the cause of action). But see
supra note 2 (citing cases disallowing the cause of action).
19941
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wrongful birth cases.48 Most jurisdictions have concluded that
plaintiffs should recover the extraordinary caretaking ex-
penses 49 of raising the child.50 Still, no clear majority rule has
emerged on the question of whether courts should allow parents
to recover damages for the emotional harm they suffer because
of the child's impairment.51 Many courts have denied or limited
48. See supra note 3 (demonstrating disagreement among courts over re-
covery of emotional harm damages).
49. Extraordinary caretaking expenses are those expenses the parents in-
cur caring for the child above those they would incur in caring for a healthy,
"normal" child. See, e.g., Schroeder v. Perkel, 432 A2d 834, 841-42 (N.J. 1981)
(recognizing that parents may recover all expenses "actually attributable to the
affliction").
50. See, e.g., id. at 840-42; Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 813 (N.Y.
1978) (holding that plaintiffs may recover extraordinary caretaking expenses).
Only the Louisiana Supreme Court has denied recovery of extraordinary care-
taking expenses. See Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 530 So. 2d 1151, 1162 (La.
1988). The birth of the impaired child in Pitre, however, was the result of a
negligently-performed sterilization procedure. Id. at 1152. The court found
that under these facts, the harm was not reasonably foreseeable. Id. at 1162.
51. Included within the general claim for "emotional distress damages" is
the emotional trauma the parents suffer upon learning of the birth defect at the
time of the child's birth, the emotional strain they endure at seeing their child
suffer and sometimes die from the birth defect, and the emotional harm they
suffer because of the denial of the couple's opportunity to control their reproduc-
tive life:
Without doubt, expectant parents, kept in ignorance of severe and per-
manent defects affecting their unborn child, suffer greatly when the
awful truth dawns upon them with the birth of the child. Human expe-
rience has told each of us, personally or vicariously, something of this
anguish. Parents of such a child experience a welter of negative feel-
ings-bewilderment, guilt, remorse and anguish-as well as anger, de-
pression and despair. When such a tragedy comes without warning
these terrible emotions are bound to be felt even more deeply. "Novelty
shock" may well exacerbate the suffering.... Through the failure of
the doctors to advise an expectant mother, and father, of the likelihood
or certainty of the birth of a [defective] child, the parents were given no
opportunity to cushion the blow, mute the hurt, or prepare themselves
as parents for the birth of their seriously impaired child. Their injury
is real and palpable. Moreover, it is not easy to overcome these feel-
ings or adjust to the tragedy of having a defective child. It is recog-
nized that a mother, even in normal circumstances, may suffer
depressive and negative feelings upon the birth of a healthy child. If
her psychological state has been further impaired by the shock of the
birth of a defective child her recovery may well be even more prolonged
and dubious. In any given case, the mental and emotional suffering of
parents might continue for some period of time beyond the birth of a
child and should be recognized as an important aspect of the parents'
injury.
Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 17-18 (N.J. 1979) (Handler, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
The parents' emotional harm also may include other elements such as the
denial of the opportunity to make an "important moral choice" for one's self, id.
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recovery of emotional distress damages and have grounded their
decisions in a variety of theories. The following discussion high-
lights the theories upon which courts have relied to disallow
emotional distress damages and demonstrates that courts have
adopted rules which inappropriately assume a male norm.
A. THEORIES COURTS HAVE USED TO DENY DAMAGES FOR
EMOTIONAL HARM IN WRONGFUL BIRTH CASES
1. The Physical Injury Requirement and the Impact Rule
Many courts have difficulty reconciling wrongful birth
claims with traditional tort law. Historically, tort law has re-
quired a plaintiff to show physical injury in order to recover
damages for emotional distress.52 Courts have struggled with
at 18, and the "diminished parental capacity" brought on by the strain of caring
for an unhealthy child, id. at 15.
Persons, confronted with the awesome decision of whether or not to
allow the birth of a defective child, face a moral dilemma of enormous
consequence. They deal with a profound moral problem. To be denied
the opportunity-indeed, the right-to apply one's own moral values in
reaching that decision, is a serious, irreversible wrong.
... Mental, emotional and moral suffering can involve diminished
parental capacity. Such incapacity of the mother and father qua par-
ents is brought about by the wrongful denial of a reasonable opportu-
nity to learn of and anticipate the birth of a child with permanent
defects, and to prepare for the heavy obligations entailed in rearing so
unfortunate an individual. Such parents may experience great diffi-
culty adjusting to their fate and accepting the child's impairment as
nature's verdict. While some individuals confronted by tragedy re-
spond magnificently and become exemplary parents, others do not.
Id. at 18 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations
omitted).
52. The law traditionally has been hesitant to award damages for mental
distress in the absence of some physical injury. KEETON ET AL., supra note 6,
§ 12, at 54-57. The reasons for denying recovery of mental distress damages
have included the difficulty of proving and measuring such damages, id. § 12, at
55, the risk of fictitious claims, id. § 12, at 56, and the fear that a rule allowing
recovery would open the door to "litigation in the field of trivialities and mere
bad manners," id. "'Against a large part of the frictions and irritations and
clashing of temperaments incident to participation in a community life, a cer-
tain toughening of the mental hide is a better protection than the law could ever
be.'" Id. § 12, at 55 (quoting Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Distur-
bance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARv. L. REV. 1033, 1035 (1936)). Courts have
been less hesitant to award damages for mental distress when the claim for
damages is "parasitic" to some other independent claim for relief under tort
law. Id. § 12, at 56-57, § 54, at 362-63. Courts consider any physical harm re-
sulting from the independent claim for relief sufficient evidence that the plain-
tiff is not feigning the emotional harm. Id. § 54, at 363.
More recently, courts have come to recognize that severe mental distress
may be an injury in itself. The earliest cases recognizing mental distress as an
independent injury involved liability of a common carrier for insult to a passen-
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the fact that parents in a wrongful birth action do not seek dam-
ages for their own physical injuries or illnesses. 53
Traditional tort law and most states5 4 require plaintiffs to
demonstrate some physical "impact" in order to recover damages
for emotional distress.55 Courts do not require plaintiffs to show
some minimum amount of physical injury; the impact can be as
slight as a "trivial jolt or jar"56 or "dust in the eye."5 7 Further,
the physical "impact" need not cause the mental harm.58 In-
ger, id. § 12, at 57-58, liability of an innkeeper for causing distress to a guest,
id. § 12, at 58, and intentional infliction of extreme emotional distress, id. § 12,
at 60-65. Courts have not yet completely defined the limits of any independent
tort for emotional harm. Id. § 12, at 57.
Courts have experienced the greatest difficulty determining whether a
plaintiff should recover for acts that, although directed at third parties, have
caused mental distress to the plaintiff. Id. § 12, at 65-66. At least two different
rules have emerged for determining whether liability should attach in such
cases. See infra notes 73-82 and accompanying text (discussing the "zone of
danger" rule and the Dillon test). Each test seeks to set some limits on the
cause of action in order to exclude those cases which involve mere "trivialities."
Id. § 12, at 56.
When a defendant's negligence causes mental harm only, courts generally
refer to the resulting cause of action as "negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress" or "negligent infliction of mental distress." Id. § 12, at 55-56.
53. In a typical wrongful birth case, the parents seek to recover for their
emotional distress and for the ordinary or extraordinary caretaking expenses
they incur in caring for their impaired child. Thus, the wrongful birth case
differs from most other tort cases in that the primary element of damages does
not arise from the physical injury suffered by the plaintiff. See generally id.
§ 54, at 362-63 (discussing traditional cases in which mental harm flows from a
physical harm). In the typical tort case, any pain and suffering or emotional
distress for which the plaintiff seeks recovery usually is a result of the physical
injury itself. Id.
54. Id. § 54, at 363 (noting requirement that plaintiff show "physical
impact").
55. At least two states which have allowed wrongful birth claims, however,
have refused to adopt exceptions to the strict physical injury requirement. In
Garrison v. Medical Ctr. of Del., Inc., 581 A.2d 288, 293 (Del. 1989), and Smith
v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341, 351 (N.H. 1986), the courts did not allow the plaintiffs'
claims for emotional harm because the plaintiffs could show no physical inju-
ries. Feminist scholars have criticized the strict physical injury requirement as
a rule which devalues "relational" and "intangible" interests in favor of mone-
tary ones. See, e.g., Bender, Lawyer's Primer, supra note 42, at 37 (arguing that
tort law devalues relational and intangible interests and instead values finan-
cial interests). When courts begin to apply the exceptions to this traditional
rule, the male norms in those exceptions become apparent.
56. KEETON ET AL., supra note 6, § 54, at 363 (citing Zelinsky v. Chimics,
175 A.2d 351 (Pa. Super. 1961); Johnson Freight Lines, Inc. v. Tallent, 384
S.W.2d 46 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964); Boston v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 61 N.E.2d
326 (Ind. 1945)).
57. Id. § 54, at 364 (citing Porter v. Delaware, L.W. R.R., 63 A. 860 (N.J.
1906)).
58. Id. § 54, at 363.
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stead, courts impose the physical injury requirement only to pro-
vide some guarantee that the claim of mental harm is genuine. 59
Once the plaintiff has proved some slight physical touching or
effect, "'the door opens to the full joy of a complete recovery.'" 60
Courts have clung to the "impact" rule to deny wrongful
birth plaintiffs recovery of emotional harm damages. In Moores
v. Lucas,61 for example, the plaintiffs sought genetic counseling
from the defendant before conception.62 Linda Moores suffered
from Larsen's Syndrome, 63 and she and her husband asked the
defendant whether her condition was inheritable. 64 The defend-
ant told them it was not, and they conceived a child who later
was born with Larsen's Syndrome. 65 The plaintiffs sought dam-
ages for their "past and future emotional pain and suffering...
resulting from the birth of their afflicted son."66 The court rec-
ogniied a cause of action for wrongful birth,6v but refused to al-
low damages for mental harm "on the basis of the impact
doctrine."68
At least two other courts have cited the "impact" rule to dis-
allow recovery for emotional harm. In Atlanta Obstetrics & Gyn-
59. Id. (noting the requirement's purpose as the prevention of disingenuous
claims).
60. Id. § 54, at 364 (quoting Herbert F. Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance
as Legal Damage, 20 MICH. L. REv. 497, 504 (1922)).
61. 405 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
62. Id. at 1024.
63. Larsen's Syndrome is characterized by "cleft palate, flattened faces,
multiple congenital dislocations, and foot deformities." DoRLAND's ILLUSTRATED
MEDIcAL DICTIONARY 1638 (27th ed. 1988) [hereinafter DomRL&'s].
64. Moores, 405 So. 2d at 1024.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1026.
68. Id. (citing Gilliam v. Stewart, 291 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1974); Herlong Avia-
tion, Inc. v. Johnson, 291 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 1974); Pazo v. Upjohn Co., 310 So. 2d
30 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975)).
In Lloyd v. North Broward Hosp. Dist., 570 So. 2d 984 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1990), another district of the same Florida court disagreed with this application
of the "impact" rule and certified "express and direct conflict" with the Moores
decision. Id. at 988-89, 989 n.4. The court offered two reasons for its disagree-
ment. First, it said the "impact" rule should not apply, because the claim for
mental harm was not the plaintiffs' only claim for damages; they also sought
recovery of their extraordinary caretaking expenses. Id. at 988; see supra note
49 (discussing extraordinary caretaking expenses in wrongful birth cases). Sec-
ond, the court stated that even if the rule did apply, the physical testing and
pregnancy which the plaintiff mother experienced were sufficient to satisfy the
requirement of a physical impact. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 132-
139 (explaining that mothers in wrongful birth actions can satisfy the require-
ments of the "impact" rule).
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ecology Group v. Abelson,69 the Georgia Court of Appeals held
that the "impact" doctrine barred the plaintiffs' claim for emo-
tional harm.70 In Pitre v. Opelousas General Hospital,71 the
Louisiana Supreme Court similarly held that the plaintiffs'
mental distress and emotional harm were "not consequences
which were caused by an impact on the person of the mother."72
No court which has applied the "impact" doctrine has concluded
that a wrongful birth plaintiff can satisfy the rule's
requirements.
2. The Bystander Doctrine
An exception to the traditional "impact" rule is the by-
stander doctrine. Under the "impact" rule, witnesses to an in-
jury ordinarily cannot recover for their own mental distress
unless they also have suffered physical impact. 73 The bystander
doctrine has emerged to allow recovery in limited circumstances.
Courts allow recovery under the "zone of danger" rule and the
Dillon test. Both rules are still extremely narrow.
69. 392 S.E.2d 916, 922 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 398
S.E.2d 557 (Ga. 1990).
70. Id. at 922. The court provided no explanation why plaintiffs could not
meet the requirements of the "impact" rule in a wrongful birth case, but it did
contrast the claim with one in which a physician's negligence has caused a
healthy child to die. Id. at 922 (citing Ob-Gyn Assoc. of Albany v. Littleton, 386
S.E.2d 146 (Ga. 1989)). The court reasoned that because the Littleton court
allowed no damages for emotional harm, such damages should not be allowed in
a wrongful birth case either. Id. at 922.
It is not clear why the court reached this decision, because parents of a
healthy child killed through a defendant's negligence usually would not be able
to satisfy the requirements of the "impact" rule. Such a case is more akin to a
bystander case, in which courts might permit recovery despite the fact that
plaintiffs can show no impact. See infra notes 73-82 (explaining the various
bystander rules). In contrast, the plaintiff mother in a wrongful birth case al-
ways can show some physical effect or "impact" which followed the defendant's
negligence. See supra text accompanying notes 54-60; infra text accompanying
notes 132-139.
The Abelson court also noted that the plaintiff mother could not satisfy the
"impact" rule by pointing to the physical effects of the pregnancy and childbirth.
Abelson, 392 S.E.2d at 922 (citing Moores v. Lucas, 405 So. 2d 1022, 1026 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1981)). Yet the court incorrectly assumed that a plaintiff can
satisfy the "impact" rule only if the physical impact caused the emotional harm.
The "impact" rule is not so narrow. See supra note 58 and accompanying text
(explaining that a plaintiff may recover for emotional distress even when the
physical impact did not cause the plaintiffs mental harm).
71. 530 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1988).
72. Id. at 1162.
73. See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text (discussing the tradi-
tional physical impact requirement).
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The "zone of danger" rule, which is the older and more nar-
row of the two rules, 74 allows a plaintiff to recover for mental
harm alone if the plaintiff was threatened by the same harm
which caused physical injury to a third party.75 Courts have
drawn the rule restrictively, however, to limit the negligent
party's liability and to prevent fictitious or trivial claims.76
The Dillon test is a less restrictive but still narrow rule first
developed by the California Supreme Court. In Dillon v. Legg,77
the court set out a three-part test for determining whether a by-
stander can recover for mental distress. 78 A bystander can re-
cover if the bystander was at the scene of the accident when it
occurred, witnessed the accident, and was closely related to the
person physically harmed by the defendant's negligence. 79 The
California Supreme Court later held that a bystander need not
meet all three requirements in order to recover,80 but it recently
retreated from this position.81 Other state courts have followed
California's approach.8 2
Numerous courts have characterized wrongful birth cases
as "bystander" cases, to which the "zone of danger" or Dillon
74. KEETON ET AL., supra note 6, § 54, at 365-66.
75. Id. § 54, at 365. Prosser and Keeton give the example of a parent
"threatened with physical injury by the defendant's negligence, as where she is
standing in the path of his vehicle, and suffers physical harm through fright at
the peril to her child [who may be hit by the vehicle]." Id.
76. Id. § 54, at 366.
77. 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
78. Id. at 920.
79. Id.
80. Ochoa v. Superior Court, 703 P.2d 1, 8 (Cal. 1985) (holding that sudden
occurrence is unnecessary); Krouse v. Graham, 562 P.2d 1022, 1031 (Cal. 1977)
(holding that plaintiff need not visually witness injury); see also Nazaroff v.
Superior Court, 145 Cal. Rptr. 657 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that plaintiff
need not witness accident).
81. See Thing v. LaChusa, 771 P.2d 814, 829-30 (Cal. 1989) (requiring all
three elements of the Dillon test).
82. See, e.g., Tommy's Elbow Room, Inc. v. Kavorkian, 727 P.2d 1038
(Alaska 1986); D'Amicol v. Alvarez Shipping Co., 326 A.2d 129 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 1973); Champion v. Gray, 478 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1985); Leong v. Takasaki, 520
P.2d 758 (Haw. 1974); Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1981); Culbert
v. Sampson's Supermarkets, Inc., 444 A.2d 433 (Me. 1982); Dziokonski v.
Babineau, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (Mass. 1978); Miller v. Cook, 273 N.W.2d 567 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1978); Versland v. Caron Transp., 671 P.2d 583 (Mont. 1983); James v.
Lieb, 375 N.W.2d 109 (Neb. 1985); State v. Eaton, 710 P.2d 1370 (Nev. 1985);
Portee v. Jaffee, 417 A-2d 521 (N.J. 1980); Ramirez v. Armstrong, 673 P.2d 822
(N.M. 1983); Paugh v. Hanks, 451 N.E.2d 759 (Ohio 1983); Sinn v. Burd, 404
A.2d 672 (Pa. 1979); D'Ambra v. United States, 338 A.2d 524 (R.I. 1975); Kinard
v. Augusta Sash & Door Co., 336 S.E.2d 465 (S.C. 1985); General Motors Corp.
v. Grizzle, 642 S.W.2d 837 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982); Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d
193 (Wyo. 1986).
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rules apply.8 3 These courts, however, have uniformly denied
mental harm damages to wrongful birth plaintiffs.8 4 While one
court has recognized that the bystander rules should not apply,
it nonetheless drew a distinction between the "direct" victim of
the harm and "bystanders" to that harm.8 5 Finally, some courts
83. See infra notes 87-110. Actually, the bystander rules are simply inap-
plicable in wrongful birth cases. The bystander rules apply only when the de-
fendant owes a duty of care to the third party but not directly to the plaintiff.
The rules permit recovery by someone other than the person directly and physi-
cally injured by the negligence and may compensate the plaintiff when the only
harm suffered is mental harm. Implied in any bystander claim is an assertion
that the defendant owed a duty of care to the third party and that the defend-
ant's negligence caused the third party to be physically harmed. The bystander
claim thus depends on a claim that the defendant acted negligently toward the
third party, and the bystander's claim derives from the third party's claim. See
generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 6, § 54, at 365-67.
In wrongful birth cases, however, the defendants owe a duty of care directly
to the parents, including a duty to properly perform prenatal tests and to rec-
ommend preconception or prenatal testing in appropriate circumstances. In
fact, those courts that have recognized a cause of action for wrongful birth have
been quite clear that the claim belongs to the parents. Parents often make ac-
companying claims for wrongful life on behalf of the child, and most courts, in
denying recognition of the claim for wrongful life, explicitly distinguish the
wrongful life claim from the wrongful birth claim. In a wrongful birth claim,
the defendants owe a duty of care to the parents. In a wrongful life claim, if
recognized, the defendants owe a duty of care to the child. If courts appropri-
ately applied the bystander rules in wrongful birth cases, the parents would be
claiming that the defendants owed a duty to the child, the defendants breached
that duty, the child was physically injured, and the parents suffered only
mental distress as a result of that physical harm. But that is not the claim of
wrongful birth parents at all. In fact, most courts would reject such a claim by
holding that the defendant owed no duty to the child. Thus, no claim for mental
harm by the parents can derive from the child's claim. See, e.g., Siemieniec v.
Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 512 N.E.2d 691 (11l. 1987) (Simon, J., specially concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that bystander rules do not apply to
wrongful birth cases because the parents are the direct victims and the only
victims of the defendant's alleged negligence).
Accordingly, the parents' claim for mental harm is just one element of their
claim for damages caused by the breach of a duty owed to them by the defend-
ant. Thus, the bystander rules are not needed and courts instead should con-
sider simply whether mental harm is a proper element of damages in a medical
malpractice action when the only other harm claimed is an economic loss. This
question is a difficult one, but it is more appropriate than the question of
whether "bystander" liability should attach.
84. See, e.g., Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 512 N.E.2d 691 (Ill. 1987)
(holding that the "zone of danger" rule bars recovery); Arche v. United States,
798 P.2d 477 (Kan. 1990) (holding that the Dillon rule bars recovery).
85. See Andalon v. Superior Court, 208 Cal. Rptr. 899, 905 (Cal. Ct. App.
1984).
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have held that regardless of whether plaintiffs are characterized
as "bystanders" or as "direct victims," they should not recover. 86
The Illinois courts have applied the "zone of danger" rule to
determine whether plaintiffs in wrongful birth actions should
recover damages for emotional harm.87 In Siemieniec v. Lu-
theran General Hospital,88 the Illinois Supreme Court deter-
mined that wrongful birth plaintiffs may recover for mental
harm only if they meet the requirements of the "zone of danger"
rule. The court stated that to recover, a plaintiff "must have,
himself, 9 been endangered by the negligence."90 The court con-
cluded that because the defendant's negligence at no time placed
the child's parents at risk of personal physical harm, the parents
could not recover for their own emotional distress.91
86. See Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978); Howard v. Lecher,
366 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1977).
87. In Goldberg v. Ruskin, 471 N.E.2d 530 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984), affd, 499
N.E.2d 406 (III. 1986), an Illinois court first hinted that the "zone of danger"
rule might apply in wrongful birth cases. In that case, the court noted that
Illinois recently had adopted the "zone of danger" rule, which requires that "'a
bystander who is in a zone of physical danger and who, because of the defend-
ant's negligence, has reasonable fear for his own safety is given a right of action
for physical injury or illness resulting from emotional distress.'" Id. at 539
(quoting Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 457 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ill. 1983)).
The court did not clearly spell out whether it thought the "zone of danger"
rule should apply to the Goldberg case, and it remanded the action to allow the
plaintiffs to replead. The court noted that in spite of the shift toward applying
the "zone of danger" rule in bystander cases, plaintiffs must accompany all
claims for mental harm, whether involving direct victims or bystanders, with
claims for physical harm or illness. Id. at 539-40. The court remanded to allow
the plaintiffs to add an allegation that they had suffered a physical harm or
illness. Id. Thus, it is not clear whether the court mentioned the "zone of dan-
ger" rule because it believed the rule applied to wrongful birth cases, or because
direct cases-such as that of the Goldbergs-still require an allegation of physi-
cal harm.
88. 512 N.E.2d 691 (Ill. 1987).
89. It seems odd that the court used a male pronoun, since both the mother
and father of the child were plaintiffs in the case. Though the court's choice of
pronoun most likely was only an oversight or an example of the common usage
of the male pronoun by judges and many other people to refer to both men and
women, it highlights the court's lack of awareness that one of the plaintiffs was
a woman. The court's pronoun choice is another small indication that in decid-
ing this wrongful birth case, the court was not sensitive to the unique facts of
pregnancy which made application of the bystander rules particularly inappro-
priate for the circumstances. See generally infra notes 140-162 and accompany-
ing text (critiquing courts' use of the bystander rule in wrongful birth cases).
90. Siemieniec, 512 N.E.2d at 707.
91. Id. The court thus affirmed the earlier decision of the Illinois Appellate
Court, which had reached the same conclusion on identical grounds. See Sie-
mieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 480 N.E.2d 1227, 1232 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985),
affd, 512 N.E.2d 691 (Ill. 1987).
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At least one court has used the Dillon rule to deny emo-
tional distress damages in a wrongful birth case. In Arche v.
United States,92 the Kansas Supreme Court presumed that the
plaintiffs' wrongful birth claim was a bystander case.93 The
court held that the plaintiffs could not recover under the rule
applicable in Kansas94 because they had not witnessed 95 the "oc-
currence which caused the injury."96 The court explained that
"[tihe child's injury in this case occurred without human fault
during development of the fetus; the parents were not aware of
the injury at the time."97 Thus, the court disallowed the plain-
tiffs' claim for mental harm damages because the plaintiffs
failed to meet the requirements of the three-part Dillon test.98
The California Court of Appeals in Andalon v. Superior
Court99 refused to apply the bystander doctrine in a wrongful
birth case because it correctly recognized that the parents in
such cases are themselves direct victims of the defendant's neg-
ligence.100 Like the Arche court, it formulated its inquiry in
terms of "direct victims" versus "bystanders." The court drew a
clear distinction between "direct victims" and "bystanders" by
noting that if Dillon did apply, the plaintiffs would be unable to
recover because they did not "witness" the "harming event."101
The dissent in Siemieniec argued correctly that the bystander rules do not
apply in a wrongful birth case, because the parents are not bystanders at all,
but instead are direct victims of the defendant's alleged negligence. Siemieniec,
512 N.E.2d at 711 (Simon, J., specially concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (arguing that the defendants owed the duty of care to the parents alone
and that the majority held as much when it refused to recognize a wrongful life
action); see also supra note 83 (explaining that defendants in a wrongful birth
case owe a duty of care directly to the parents, making the bystander rules
inapplicable).
92. 798 P.2d 477 (Kan. 1990).
93. Id. at 482 (stating the Kansas rule regarding bystander claims without
first explaining why the rule was applicable).
94. Kansas seemed to have previously adopted the three-part test first for-
mulated in Dillon. See Smelko v. Brinton, 740 P.2d 591, 598 (Kan. 1987) (hold-
ing that plaintiff could not recover under the Dillon rule); Schmeck v. City of
Shawnee, 647 P.2d 1263, 1266 (Kan. 1982) (same).
95. The first prong of the three part Dillon test requires that the plaintiff
physically witness the harm done to the third party. See supra text accompany-
ing note 79.
96. Arche, 798 P.2d at 482.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. 208 Cal. Rptr. 899 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
100. Id. at 905; see supra note 83 (explaining that defendants in a wrongful
birth case owe a duty of care directly to the parents).
101. Andalon, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 903 n.4.
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According to the court, "[tihe 'injury' to the child occurred... in
utero, presumably at the moment of conception."
10 2
Finally, at least one court has refused in all cases to award
damages for mental distress in the absence of physical injury.
Applying this rule to wrongful birth cases, the New York Court
of Appeals twice has denied recovery for mental harm in wrong-
ful birth cases by treating the parents as "bystanders" to the
harm done by the physician. 103 In Howard v. Lecher,10 4 the
court pointed out that the plaintiffs "were made to bear no phys-
ical or mental injury, other than the anguish of observing their
child suffer."10 5 Citing the leading case in New York regarding
liability to bystanders, 0 6 the court concluded that it should im-
pose no liability in a wrongful birth action for mental harm
caused to the parents. 07 A year later, in Becker v. Schwartz,
0 8
the New York court followed the rule it adopted in Howard and
concluded that parents in a wrongful birth action cannot recover
damages for mental harm. 10 9 It contrasted the emotional harm
suffered in wrongful birth cases with the harm suffered in cases
102. Id. The child in question inAndalon was born with Down's Syndrome.
Id. at 900. Consequently, the genetic defect which caused the child's condition
was present from the moment of conception. OxFoRD's, supra note 16, at 1373.
103. See Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978); Howard v. Lecher,
366 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1977).
104. 366 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1977).
105. Id. at 66.
106. Id. (citing Tobin v. Grossman, 249 N.E.2d 419 (N.Y. 1969)). In Tobin, a
mother who was nearby when a car struck her child sought to recover for the
mental anguish she suffered at seeing the harm done to her child by the defend-
ant's alleged negligence. Tobin, 249 N.E.2d at 419. The court held that the
mother could not recover for her own mental injuries regardless of whether she
witnessed the harm done to her child. Id. at 419-20. The court thus rejected
the rule adopted by the California Supreme Court in Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d
912 (Cal. 1968). Tobin, 249 N.E.2d at 419-20; see supra text accompanying
notes 77-82 (explaining the Dillon rule). The court also implicitly rejected the
"zone of danger" rule. Tobin, 249 N.E.2d at 423; see supra text accompanying
notes 74-76 (explaining the "zone of danger" rule). Later, the court reversed
itself in part and adopted the "zone of danger" rule for bystander cases. See
Bovsun v. Sanperi, 461 N.E.2d 843 (N.Y. 1984).
Since their adoption of the "zone of danger" rule, the New York courts have
not had the opportunity to determine whether the rule applies in a wrongful
birth action. Even if it does apply, it probably would not yield a result contrary
to the one reached in Howard and Becker. See generally infra text accompany-
ing notes 140-149.
107. Howard, 366 N.E.2d at 66. Because the plaintiffs in Howard only
sought damages for mental harm, the court disallowed the entire wrongful
birth claim. Id.
108. 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978).
109. Id. at 813.
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in which the defendant breached a duty owed directly to the
plaintiff, and not as a bystander to harm.110
3. The "Benefit/Burden" Rule
Other courts have used the "benefit/burden" rule found in
section 920 of the Second Restatement of Torts either to deny
recovery of mental distress damages or to limit the amount of
damages awarded. The "benefit/burden" rule is a general rule of
tort law which requires the court to offset any award of damages
for the "burden" imposed by the defendant's negligence against
any "benefit" the plaintiff has enjoyed because of the defendant's
negligence.' 1 ' Defendants in wrongful birth actions have cited
section 920 and claimed that courts should offset any emotional
harm suffered by the plaintiffs against the emotional benefit the
plaintiffs have derived from the defendants' negligence. Defend-
ants have argued that in the absence of their negligence, the
parents would not have carried the child to term, and would not
have enjoyed the benefits of parenthood which the defendants'
negligence made possible. 112
At least two approaches to the "benefit/burden" rule have
emerged in wrongful birth cases. Under the first approach,
courts have held that any damages a jury would award, after
balancing the emotional harm suffered by the parents against
the benefits they have gained from parenthood, would be too
speculative. 1 3 These courts have concluded that because of the
speculative nature of the damages, no damages for emotional
110. The court contrasted Johnson v. State, 334 N.E.2d 590 (N.Y. 1975),
with Becker. In Johnson, the plaintiff had received notice incorrectly telling her
that her mother had died. The court reasoned that Johnson was distinguish-
able from Becker because only in Johnson did the defendant owe a duty of care
directly to the plaintiff. Thus, it characterized Johnson as a case involving a
"direct victim," while it characterized wrongful birth cases like Becker as involv-
ing a "bystander." This characterization of wrongful birth cases, however, mis-
states the claims made by the plaintiffs. See generally supra note 83.
111. The text of § 920 of the Second Restatement of Torts describes the bal-
ancing test under the "benefit/burden" rule:
When the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff
or to his property and in so doing has conferred a special benefit to the
interest of the plaintiff that was harmed, the value of the benefit con-
ferred is considered in mitigation of damages, to the extent that this is
equitable.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1965).
112. See, e.g., Viccaro v. Milunsky, 551 N.E.2d 8 (Mass. 1990); Eisbrenner v.
Stanley, 308 N.W.2d 209 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981); Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d
807 (N.Y. 1978); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); Harbeson v.
Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983) (en banc).
113. See, e.g., Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 814; Jacobs, 519 S.W.2d at 849.
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harm can be allowed as a matter of law.114 Under the second
approach, courts have allowed the question of mental harm
damages to go to the jury, but have instructed the jury to weigh
the emotional harm done to the parents against the benefit the
parents experienced as a result of the child's birth.115
a. No Recovery as a Matter of Law Under the "Benefit!
Burden" Rule.
In one of the first wrongful birth cases decided by an Ameri-
can court, the New York Court of Appeals in Becker v.
Schwartz16 held that damages for emotional harm are not re-
coverable as a matter of law. In part,11 7 the court reasoned that
damages for mental harm are not recoverable because the par-
ents most likely enjoyed an emotional benefit from defendant's
negligence-the benefit of parenthood:
To be sure, parents of a deformed infant will suffer the anguish that
only parents can experience upon the birth of a child in an impaired
state. However, notwithstanding the birth of a child afflicted with an
abnormality, and certainly dependent upon the extent of the affliction,
parents may yet experience a love that even an abnormality cannot
fully dampen.1 1
8
The court cited section 920 of the Second Restatement of Torts
and stated that it would weigh the emotional burdens to the par-
ents against the emotional benefits they enjoyed. 119 Without ex-
planation, the court concluded that because this analysis
"remains too speculative,"1 20 the parents cannot recover emo-
tional harm damages.' 21
With even less explanation, the Texas Supreme Court held,
in the first case recognizing a wrongful birth claim, that dam-
ages for emotional harm are not recoverable as a matter of
law.122 Although the court did not cite section 920, its reasoning
114. See, e.g., Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 814; Jacobs, 519 S.W.2d at 849.
115. See, e.g., Viccaro, 551 N.E.2d at 11-12; Eisbrenner, 308 N.W.2d at 214;
Harbeson, 656 P.2d at 495.
116. 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978).
117. The court also refused to allow recovery of damages for mental harm
because the plaintiffs failed to show a physical injury to accompany their claim
for mental harm. Id. at 902 (citing Howard v. Lecher, 366 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y.
1977)); see generally supra note 52 (discussing the traditional hesitance of
courts to award damages for mental harm without proof of physical injury).
118. Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 813-14.
119. Id. at 814.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 849 (Tex. 1975); see supra notes 14-
22 and accompanying text (discussing the Jacobs decision).
1994]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
acknowledged the force of a "benefit/burden" rule. The court
concluded without substantial analysis that an award of mental
harm damages would be "based upon speculation as to the qual-
ity of life and as to the pluses and minuses of parental mind and
emotion."123
b. Recovery as a Jury Question Under the "Benefit/Burden"
Rule.
Several courts consider the "benefit/burden" rule relevant to
their assessment of damages, but leave to the jury the difficult
task of determining how to weigh the relative benefits and bur-
dens of parenthood in wrongful birth cases.124 In Harbeson v.
Parke-Davis, Inc.,125 for example, the court cited section 920 of
the Second Restatement of Torts and concluded that "[in consid-
ering damages for emotional injury, the jury should be entitled
to consider the countervailing emotional benefits attributable to
the birth of the child."1 26 Similarly, in Eisbrenner v. Stanley,127
the Michigan Court of Appeals concluded that the jury should
apply the "benefit/burden" rule in a wrongful birth case. 128 In
Viccaro v. Milunsky,129 the Massachusetts Supreme Court
agreed with the plaintiffs' concession that the jury should apply
the "benefit/burden" rule in assessing damages for emotional
harm. 130 No court has explained, however, exactly how a jury
should balance the benefits and harms or what factors it should
consider in its analysis.
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., Viccaro v. Milunsky, 551 N.E.2d 8, 11-12 (Mass. 1990); Eis-
brenner v. Stanley, 308 N.W.2d 209, 214 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981); Harbeson v.
Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 493 (Wash. 1983) (en banc).
125. 656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983) (en banc).
126. Id. at 493.
127. 308 N.W.2d 209 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
128. Id. at 214 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1965)).
129. 551 N.E.2d 8 (Mass. 1990).
130. Id. at 11-12. Apparently, the parents conceded that the court should
offset any emotional benefits they derived from the existence of their impaired
child against the damages they would receive for emotional harm. The court
noted that the "benefit/burden" rule should apply to the assessment of damages
for extraordinary caretaking expenses as well, although the court was not
asked to address this question on appeal. Id. The offset of emotional benefits
against caretaking expenses is inconsistent with the rule set out in the Restate-
ment; the Restatement explicitly states that only benefits of the same type as
the damages sought may be offset. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920
cmt. b (1965) ("Damages resulting from an invasion of one interest are not di-
minished by showing that another interest has been benefited.").
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B. A FEMINIST ANALYSIS OF THEORIES COURTS HAVE USED TO
DENY DAMAGES FOR EMOTIONAL HARM iN WRONGFUL
BIRTH CASES
Whether they use the "impact" rule, the bystander doctrine,
or the "benefitlburden rule" to deny recovery of emotional harm
damages, courts in wrongful birth cases have premised their
reasoning upon assumptions about women's reproductive lives
that do not accord with women's actual experiences. The follow-
ing discussion applies Wishik's seven-step inquiry 31 to demon-
strate this disparity between women's presumed and actual
experiences, reveals the patriarchical interests which the cur-
rent misrepresentation of women's experiences serve, and sug-
gests possible reforms.
1. The Disparity Between Women's Actual Experiences and
the Law's Description of Those Experiences
a. A Feminist Critique of Courts' Use of the Impact Doctrine.
Although courts have employed the impact doctrine to deny
emotional harm damages, plaintiffs in a wrongful birth case can
easily satisfy the simple requirement of a "physical impact."
The plaintiff mother always experiences some physical effects
flowing from the defendant's negligence: she carries her preg-
nancy to term. In fact, the essence of her claim is that had the
defendant exercised due care, she would have terminated her
pregnancy. Certainly, pregnancy is a "physical" condition or ef-
fect. Further, wrongful birth plaintiffs sometimes undergo med-
ical examinations which defendants perform negligently.1 32 Of
course, these medical examinations involve a physical "touch-
ing." After giving birth to an impaired child, moreover, the wo-
man might breast-feed the child. Certainly, these conditions are
physical "impacts" as significant as a "trivial jolt or jar"1 33 or
"dust in the eye."134 Further, the law does not require the plain-
131. See supra text accompanying notes 43-45.
132. For instance, the plaintiff mother in Garrison v. Medical Ctr. of Del.,
Inc., 581 A.2d 288 (Del. 1989), twice underwent an amniocentesis; she claimed
her physician was negligent in performing the first examination and in delay-
ing the results of the second examination. Id. at 289-90. This negligence re-
sulted in the birth of a child with Down's Syndrome. Id. The physical impact
experienced by the mother was hardly "slight." Amniocentesis is performed by
inserting a needle through a woman's abdomen and into her uterus in order to
withdraw amniotic fluid. OxFoRD's, supra note 16, at 41.
133. KEETON T AL., supra note 6, § 54, at 363.
134. Id. § 54, at 364.
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tiff to show that the physical impact is the cause of the mental
harm.135
The courts in Moores,13 6 Abelson,137 and Pitre138 failed to
recognize that a wrongful birth plaintiff can easily meet the
physical impact requirement. The Moores court went so far as to
conclude explicitly that Linda Moores had experienced no physi-
cal impact as a result of the defendant's negligence. 13 9 The
courts' reasoning in these cases reveals an obvious male stance
which regards pregnancy as a non-physical experience. For wo-
men, few experiences are more physical than pregnancy and
childbirth. Yet these courts fail to recognize this simple fact. Of
course, when viewed from the male perspective, pregnancy is
not a physical experience; men do not carry their unborn chil-
dren inside them, amniocentesis needles do not enter their abdo-
mens, and their children do not pass through their bodies as
they enter the world. A rule that treats pregnancy from this
male perspective, however, denies the reality of women's exper-
iences. It also yields the absurd conclusion that pregnancy and
childbirth are not physical experiences.
b. A Feminist Critique of Courts' Use of the Bystander
Doctrine.
Traditional rules governing "bystander" cases create a di-
chotomy between the self and the other.' 40 If one's self suffers
direct physical harm, courts will compensate plaintiffs for any
emotional harm also suffered. If other individuals suffer physi-
cal harm, however, the law in most states will not compensate
plaintiffs for their own emotional harm. The rules do not con-
template any other circumstances; either one's "self' is injured,
or an "other" is injured. The dichotomy between self and other
breaks down in a wrongful birth action, however, because the
distinction between the self and the other is blurred in the case
of a pregnant woman and her unborn child.141 The law's as-
135. Id. § 54, at 363.
136. 405 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
137. 392 S.E.2d 916 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 398 S.E.2d
557 (Ga. 1990).
138. 530 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1988).
139. Moores, 405 So. 2d at 1026.
140. Feminist theorists have argued that such dichotomies are prevalent
throughout the law, and that they represent a male world view. See, e.g.,
Bender, Lawyer's Primer, supra note 42, at 27.
141. "Pregnancy is the quintessential female experience. It is an experience
of attachment and separation, both more total than is possible in any other
relationship. It is an attachment so complete that it can only be torn apart in
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sumption that we are all "essentially, necessarily" 142 separate
from others is inaccurate when we speak about pregnancy be-
cause the pregnant woman is quite clearly connected to an
"other": her unborn child.143 The difficulties courts have in rec-
ognizing this reality demonstrate the inadequacy of the existing
rules.
Feminist legal theorists have pointed out the "false opposi-
tions" or dualities in the law, including the false duality of self
and other.144 This dichotomy reflects a "culture designed from a
masculine perspective,"145 one that fails to account for the
uniquely female experience of pregnancy.
Not surprisingly, when the rules regarding recovery of dam-
ages for emotional harm depend on the dichotomy between self
and other, any attempt to apply those rules to the case of the
pregnant woman will be difficult. One simply cannot speak of a
pregnant woman only as a "bystander" to anything that happens
to her unborn child. In a real, physiological sense, what hap-
pens to her unborn child happens to her as well. It is untenable
for the law to split the mother and her unborn child into two
entities. 146 By applying the bystander rules to wrongful birth
cases, however, this is precisely what courts have done.
The Siemieniec147 court, for example, made no attempt to
discuss the particular facts of the wrongful birth scenario when
it concluded that the parents were unable to meet the require-
ments of the "zone of danger" rule. Instead, the court summarily
concluded that the plaintiffs were unable to satisfy the rule's re-
blood and pain." BARBARA KATz RoTLNN, THE TENTATIVE PREGNANCY 111
(1986).
142. Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 2 (1988)
("Women are not essentially, necessarily, inevitably, invariably, always, and
forever separate from other human beings: women, distinctively, are quite
clearly 'connected' to another human life when pregnant.").
143. Id.
144. See, e.g., Bender, Lawyer's Primer, supra note 42, at 27.
145. Caroline Whitbeck, A Different Reality: Feminist Ontology, in BEYOND
DOMINATION: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON WOMEN AND PHILOSOPHY 64 (Carol Gould
ed., 1984).
146. This statement does not depend on a belief that the child is not a sepa-
rate "person" who deserves to be recognized as such under the law. Opposing
sides in the abortion debate argue over the status of the fetus as a separate
"person." Regardless of which side one takes in this debate, the simple fact
remains that one cannot draw a clear physiological distinction between the
pregnant woman and her unborn child. Although one may wish to recognize
the separate "rights" of a fetus, one cannot deny that the fetus lies inside the
pregnant woman's body, that the body of the fetus is physically linked to the
body of the pregnant woman, and that the bodies of the two interact.
147. 480 N.E.2d 1227 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985), affd, 512 N.E.2d 691 (IM. 1987).
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quirements. 148 Of course, the rule's formulation made it impos-
sible for the plaintiffs-especially the mother-to recover. No
wrongful birth plaintiff ever could satisfy the rule149 because the
rule presupposes a "bystander" who watches the injury to a sep-
arate individual. The language of the rule simply does not con-
template a circumstance in which two individuals-an unborn
child and its mother-are physiologically inseparable.
Furthermore, when the Arche' 50 court attempted to apply
the Dillon rule,' 51 it stumbled because courts did not draft the
rule with pregnant women in mind; the rule assumes a self and
an other as two distinct beings. The court noted the require-
ment that the plaintiff must witness the injury done to the third
party, and concluded that the plaintiffs failed to meet that re-
quirement. 152 Obviously, a pregnant woman cannot "witness"
injuries done to her self/unborn child. The term "witness" as-
sumes two separate entities, one who is the subject of the tor-
tious act and one who watches. Of course, a pregnant woman
literally cannot "see" inside her uterus to witness whatever is
happening to her unborn child. Nonetheless, she experiences
something much more intimate with her unborn child than a
148. "[We are unable to perceive, under the facts of this case, how [the
plaintiffs] can satisfy the... rule, namely, that they were 'in a zone of physical
danger and. . . [had] reasonable fear for ... [their] own safety.'" Siemieniec,
480 N.E.2d at 1232 (quoting Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 457 N.E.2d 1 (Ill.
1983)).
The court also indicated that Illinois still recognizes the "impact" doctrine
and that the "zone of danger" rule is only an exception for courts to apply when
the plaintiffs cannot satisfy the requirements of the "impact" rule. Id. at 1232.
Yet, it did not examine in detail whether the plaintiffs could meet the require-
ments of the "impact" rule. Id. If the court had analyzed the "impact" rule in
more detail, it may have determined that its requirements were easily met in a
wrongful birth case, at least with respect to the plaintiff mother. See supra text
accompanying notes 132-139.
149. The plaintiff mother could never satisfy the rule. Most likely, plaintiff
fathers could never satisfy the rule either, though the father is always physi-
cally separate from the impaired child. My argument is only that the plaintiff
mother can never satisfy the bystander rules because a mother can never be a
bystander to events involving her unborn child. The formulation of the rule
ignores this reality.
150. 798 P.2d 477 (Kan. 1990); see supra text accompanying notes 92-98
(discussing the Arche decision).
151. See supra text accompanying notes 77-82 (discussing the Dillon rule).
152. "We have thus far held that visibility of results as opposed to visibility
of the tortious act does not give rise to a claim for emotional damages .... [T]he
parents were not aware of the injury at the time [of the alleged negligence]."
Arche, 798 P.2d at 482.
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mother experiences when watching from a physical distance
while her (born) child is injured. 153
Even after the child is born, the existing rules fail to ac-
knowledge the degree of connectedness which the mother exper-
iences with her child. Apart from the case of pregnancy, the law
in this area incorporates a male norm by assuming that all indi-
viduals are inherently separate from one another. In contrast, a
female norm would assume a certain degree of connectedness
with one another.154 The easiest case to make for this connect-
edness is the case of the mother and child, especially during the
child's early life. 155 Yet courts have applied the bystander rules
and denied recovery for the emotional distress the mother en-
153. This analysis also reveals yet another flaw in the use of the bystander
rules in wrongful birth cases. Even if the mother could physically "see" what
happens to her unborn child, nothing "happens" to the child in the wrongful
birth case. Indeed, the essence of the wrongful birth claim is not that someone
has done something affirmatively and physically which caused the child to be
born with a birth defect. Instead, the plaintiffs claim that the defendant physi-
cian failed to do something with regard to the unborn child (by not testing the
child for birth defects, for example). Once again, the difficulty of applying the
existing rules demonstrates that courts did not formulate the rules with this
kind of case in mind. Instead, the rules contemplate a scenario in which a sud-
den occurrence (such as a traffic accident) caused physical harm to another. In
a wrongful birth case, the physical harm-the birth defects-are caused or per-
petuated by the physician's failure to do anything when some affirmative action
was called for.
154. "[P]erhaps the central insight of feminist theory of the last decade has
been that woman [sic] are 'essentially connected,' not 'essentially separate,'
from the rest of human life, both materially, through pregnancy, intercourse,
and breast-feeding, and existentially, through the moral and practical life."
West, supra note 142, at 3.
West contrasts her view of human existence with that espoused by several
male legal theorists that all human beings are essentially separate. Id. at 1-2
(citing ROBERT Nozic, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974); ROBERTO MAN-
GABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLrrIcs (1984); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LiBER-
ALISM AmD THE LmIrrs OF JusTicE (1982)). These advocates of the "separation
thesis" argue that the fact of separation is the foundation for law and liberal
society. West argues that the separation thesis is "patently untrue of women."
Id. at 2, 4-42; see Bender, Lawyer's Primer, supra note 42, at 28-30 (stating that
the legal system should respond to the "interdependencies and interconnected-
ness" reflected in the feminist voice) (citing CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT
VOICE (1982)).
155. This is so because during the first months of a child's life, the child is
completely dependent upon another (usually but not always the mother) for its
very survival; all its physical and emotional needs must be met by another. The
fact that a newborn's sole source of food usually comes physically from the
mother's body is evidence of a degree of "connectedness" between mother and
child. "[W]omen are in some sense 'connected' to life and to other human beings
during... the post-pregnancy experience of breast-feeding." West, supra note
142, at 2-3.
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dures by witnessing her young infant suffer from severe physical
or mental defects. 156 Once again, the apparently neutral rules
governing bystander cases fail to acknowledge women's actual
experiences' 5 7 and instead adopt a male norm which inevitably
disfavors the claims of women' 58 for recovery of damages.
Because the rules do not contemplate a world in which indi-
viduals may be physiologically inseparable-as in the case of a
woman and her unborn child-any attempt to apply the by-
stander rules to a wrongful birth case will be awkward at best
and absurd at worst. Courts will conclude quickly that the rules
make it impossible for the wrongful birth plaintiff to recover,
without analyzing whether it makes good policy sense in these
cases for courts to award mental harm damages. In this man-
ner, the bystander rules become a proxy for other, unstated rea-
sons for denying recovery.
For instance, courts have been slow to award damages for
emotional harm alone159 because they wish to avoid claims for
harm that is often "temporary and relatively trivial," 60 they
fear that claims of emotional harm are too easily falsified, 161
and they worry about imposing financial liability disproportion-
ate to the harm caused.162 Courts should examine these con-
cerns directly when deciding whether to award mental harm
damages in wrongful birth cases, instead of hiding behind rules
that were conceived for a world in which pregnant women do not
exist.
c. A Feminist Critique of Courts' Application of the "Benefit!
Burden" Rule.
When courts conclude as a matter of law that emotional
harm damages are not recoverable under the "benefit/burden"
156. "It cannot be denied that [the parents] themselves were made to bear
no physical or mental injury, other than the anguish of observing their child
suffer." Howard v. Lecher, 366 N.E.2d 64, 66 (N.Y. 1977).
157. That is, women experience as mothers a unique psychological and
physical connection with their children.
158. Of course, this approach also disfavors the wrongful birth claims of
men, because fathers can be plaintiffs in wrongful birth actions.
159. Again, wrongful birth claims are not claims for mental harm "alone."
Plaintiffs also seek other damages, including extraordinary caretaking ex-
penses. Thus, the general rule that mental harm damages, standing alone, are
not recoverable is inapposite in the context of wrongful birth claims. See gener-
ally supra note 83.
160. KEETON ET AL., supra note 6, § 54, at 360-61.
161. Id. § 54, at 361.
162. Id.
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rule, they assume that in all wrongful birth cases, the parents
are better off because of the defendant's negligence. The
Becker 163 court expressed this sentiment when it noted that the
parents "may yet experience a love that even an abnormality
cannot fully dampen."164 This sort of generalization is danger-
ous, because it plays on the stereotype that all women are ful-
filled through motherhood, and that all women are better off in
their traditional role as mothers. This belief does not often hold
true even in the case of a healthy child. In the case of a severely
impaired child, the stereotype plays on the romanticized notion
of parenthood while it trivializes the emotional pain of parents
who must witness the early death of a young child 165 or care for
a severely impaired child for the rest of their own lives.166 By
invoking the stereotypical view of woman as fulfilled mother,
courts play a cruel joke on parents who may have been emotion-
ally devastated by their child's impairment and who may have
found little if any emotional satisfaction in the burden they have
taken on as a result of the defendant's negligence.
A rule allowing a jury to consider the relative benefits and
burdens of parenting an impaired child is an improvement over
one that simply stereotypes women and motherhood. Unless ju-
ries are expressly cautioned, however, they may resort to the
same stereotypes the Becker 167 and Jacobs168 courts used.
Courts that choose to invoke the "benefit/burden" rule should ex-
pressly instruct jurors that they should avoid oversentimentaliz-
ing parenthood and should avoid stereotypical notions of women
as satisfied mothers. Instead, jurors should look to the particu-
lar facts of the case, including the severity of the child's impair-
ment and the emotional strain the impairment has imposed
upon the particular plaintiffs.
This task never will be easy. Courts, however, often ask ju-
rors to decide difficult questions, especially when they must as-
163. Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978).
164. Id. at 814.
165. For instance, children born with anencephaly die within a few days of
birth. OxFoRD's, supra note 16, at 66. The parents of these children have little
if any time to experience "a love that even an abnormality cannot fully
dampen." Children afflicted with Tay-Sachs disease die within the first few
years of life. Id. at 1373.
166. For instance, children with Down's Syndrome often live well into adult-
hood; yet some of these children require constant care and never become self-
sufficient. Id. at 325.
167. Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978).
168. Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975).
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sess damages for emotional harm.169 Certainly, some cases will
be easier than others; the parents of an anencephalic infant will
derive little emotional benefit from their child's few days of life,
while the parents of a Down's Syndrome child may derive great
pleasure at every new accomplishment they witness as their
child grows into an adult. Still, stereotypes of women as
mothers have no place in these determinations, and rules that
invoke those stereotypes fail to acknowledge the complex exper-
iences and emotions of individual women.
2. Patriarchal Interests Served by the Misrepresentation of
Women's Actual Reproductive Experiences
Although the language of the cases discussing emotional
harm damages in wrongful birth actions does not reveal any ex-
plicit patriarchal motives, the resulting pattern of distortion evi-
dences some of the motives served by a continuation of the
distortion. By speaking only of the technical rules regarding
emotional harm damages and ignoring the details of the actual
harm that results from wrongful birth, courts deny the impor-
tance and severity of the emotional harm suffered by parents
who must watch their children suffer and sometimes die, while
at the same time knowing they may have been able to do some-
thing to prevent it. This disregard for emotional harm is consis-
tent with the suggestion of feminist theorists that the law
traditionally has devalued emotional harm and instead has
placed greater value on financial harm.1 70 By resorting to any
rule available without first examining whether the rule fits the
situation, courts have been able to discard the claims of women
with ease.
Perhaps courts have looked for any rule that will deny re-
covery of emotional harm damages in wrongful birth cases be-
cause the claims in these cases make judges uncomfortable.
Indeed, these are difficult cases to address; plaintiffs ask judges
to acknowledge that a child's birth caused enormous suffering,
and that thought simply does not fit into the simpler framework
that assumes all births are happy births and that all children
169. I do not envy the juror who must assign a dollar value to the harm of
spending the rest of one's life in a wheelchair, or of losing the companionship of
a spouse, or of forfeiting one's reproductive capacity to a defective birth control
device. But juries must decide these hard cases; they have proved capable of
doing so and are capable of measuring damages in wrongful birth cases as well.
170. See, e.g., Bender, Lawyer's Primer, supra note 42, at 37 (noting that
tort law provides compensation for financial loss but makes recovery for "rela-
tional loss" and intangible harm difficult).
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will be healthy and bring joy to their parents.171 Judges, like
most people, do not like to confront the fact that these expecta-
tions will not always be met. Many women and men, however,
are faced with a more tragic reality. As long as we refuse to
confront these more difficult cases, parents will be left to fend
for themselves and their anguish will remain private.17 2
3. Suggestions for Legal Reforms and Other Changes That
Will Lead to a Better Situation for Women
Courts should hold explicitly that plaintiffs in wrongful
birth cases can recover damages for emotional harm. Indeed,
any legal reforms that would allow parents to recover damages
for the emotional harm they have suffered would improve wo-
men's situation, because it would signal that the emotional
harm suffered in wrongful birth cases is significant enough that
the legal system will acknowledge and provide compensation for
it. The law no longer should devalue women's suffering in these
cases but rather should acknowledge the pain as a real and im-
portant element of the harm caused.
Even if a court is disinclined to allow damages in wrongful
birth cases, 173 however, it should adopt a more honest approach
171. I do not mean to imply that impaired children cannot bring joy to their
parents, nor that parents always will want to avoid the birth of an impaired
child. In fact, I am troubled by the tone taken by many of the courts in these
cases, because they seem to assume that the birth of an impaired child always
is a bad thing, to be avoided whenever possible. Such a view devalues children,
parenthood, and persons with disabilities. The Washington Supreme Court
highlighted the difficulties presented by new medical technology when it asked,
"([A]re these developments the first steps towards a 'Fascist-Orwellian societal
attitude of genetic purity,' . . . or Huxley's brave new world?" Harbeson v.
Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 491 (Wash. 1983) (en banc) (citation omitted).
Barbara Katz Rothman also argues that the ability to detect birth defects in
utero and to terminate a pregnancy is leading to a new social norm under which
parents are expected to prevent the birth of an impaired child. See RorimA,
supra note 141, at 11-13.
172. For a thorough discussion of the feminist argument that the law has
privatized women's concerns, and so placed them beyond the reach of the law,
see Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the Public/Private Distinction, 45 STAN. L.
REV. 1 (1992).
173. I suspect that courts are hesitant to award damages for emotional
harm partially because of a concern that tort verdicts already are too large.
State legislatures have initiated many efforts to limit recovery in tort cases.
George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis & Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE
L.J. 1521, 1550-63 (1987) (noting that 42 states have enacted tort reform legis-
lation). Much of this concern has grown out of the insurance crisis, in which
many potential tort defendants have found it increasingly difficult to secure
liability insurance. Id. This concern has been especially keen among physi-
cians threatened with medical malpractice liability. David J. Nye et al., The
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by examining the policy reasons which courts traditionally have
invoked to deny recovery for emotional harm alone. Such an ap-
proach would treat women's emotional concerns openly and seri-
ously. Although this exercise might still result in a denial of
recovery, women would know that courts are taking their exper-
iences seriously, instead of misrepresenting the reality of wo-
men's experiences in order to reach a quick and easy result.
An honest examination of policy, though, would make it dif-
ficult for courts to dismiss many wrongful birth claims. Gener-
ally, courts have been hesitant to allow recovery for emotional
harm alone because of the difficulty of proving and measuring
damages, the risk of fictitious claims, and the fear that a rule
allowing recovery would lead to litigation over trivial mat-
ters. 17 4 In most wrongful birth cases, courts would be hard
pressed to characterize the parents' claims as "trivial"; it is diffi-
cult to imagine any greater pain than watching a child suffer or
die an early death. Similarly, a court rarely would be justified in
questioning whether such claims are genuine; it would be a most
unusual case in which a court might doubt the grief expressed
by the parents. Likewise, most plaintiffs would not have trouble
proving that they have suffered emotionally.
Thus, the only possible ground on which a court might base
a decision to deny recovery would be that the measure of dam-
ages is difficult to establish. This argument has some merit, es-
pecially when the child will live many years and provide some
emotional satisfaction to the parents. 7 5 The argument is much
Causes of the Medical Malpractice Crisis: An Analysis of Claims Data & Insur-
ance Company Finances, 76 GEo. L.J. 1495 (1988) (discussing the liability crisis
among doctors). Among physicians, obstetricians constitute the group most
threatened with loss of insurance. Id. (noting that specialties such as obstetrics
have been disproportionately affected by the insurance crisis). Because obste-
tricians often are defendants in wrongful birth cases, it is no wonder that courts
have tried to provide some protection against large verdicts in these cases.
I share the concern regarding the liability crisis, but I do not believe that
the way to solve the crisis is to invoke rules which do not fit the situation at
hand and which devalue women's experiences.
174. See supra note 52 (stating three policy reasons why courts have denied
emotional harm damages in the absence of physical injury).
175. The cases involving Down's Syndrome come to mind here. While the
suffering of the parents of these children is great, it seems most difficult to
measure that suffering against the joy the parents might experience at watch-
ing their children grow and develop, especially when the children in question
only suffer from mild mental retardation and have no severe physical problems.
If a court were to invoke the "benefit/burden" rule, see supra notes 111-130, a
jury might find it nearly impossible to determine whether the benefits out-
weighed the burdens.
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weaker when the child in question dies shortly after birth.'7 6 If
jurors can determine that any emotional benefits did not out-
weigh the emotional harm suffered by the parents, the only is-
sue will be determining the dollar amount to assign to that
suffering. Yet our legal system routinely asks jurors to assign
dollar values to emotional suffering, and there is no reason to
assume jurors could not also do so in wrongful birth cases.177
Of course, much of the mental anguish suffered by parents
in wrongful birth cases would not exist if our world were less
hostile toward the physically and mentally impaired. A signifi-
cant portion of the emotional pain these parents178 suffer is
caused by the fact that society will discriminate against their
children. Children with physical impairments will fight a con-
stant battle throughout their lives for access to education, jobs,
and public facilities. 179 Children with mental impairments will
be even worse off; education for these children may be inade-
quate or unaffordable.' s0 All impaired children will be the tar-
get of jokes by cruel children and may find it difficult to obtain
adequate care and community support after their parents are
gone. In a more ideal world, parents would not suffer to the ex-
tent they do now, because society would accept and care for their
children.
III. ESTABLISHING PROOF OF CAUSATION IN
WRONGFUL BIRTH CASES
Even if a court decides to recognize a cause of action for
wrongful birth, the plaintiffs still must establish each element of
176. For instance, I believe most jurors would have little difficulty determin-
ing that the benefits of having an anencephalic infant did not outweigh the
emotional burden of watching the child die shortly after birth.
177. See supra note 169.
178. I am speaking now of parents of children who will not necessarily die
early in life, for example, parents of children with Down's Syndrome, cystic fi-
brosis, or various physical abnormalities.
179. Though in 1990 Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117 (Supp. 1993), which was intended to remove these
barriers, progress toward compliance has been slow, and legal action to enforce
its provisions is inevitable.
180. Bernadette Marczely, The Americans With Disabilities Act: Con-
fronting the Shortcomings of Section 504 in Public Education, 78 EDUC. L. RPTR.
199 (1993) (setting out the difficulties handicapped children have faced since
passage of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act); Martha M. McCar-
thy, The Public School's Responsibility to Serve Severely Handicapped Children,
49 EDUC. L. RPTR. 453 (1989) (showing how courts have struggled to determine
the extent of the state's obligation to educate severely mentally impaired
children).
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a negligence claim.18 ' Among the elements they must show,
plaintiffs must prove that the defendant's lack of due care
"caused"18 2 the plaintiffs' harm. To satisfy this requirement,
most courts have assumed wrongful birth plaintiffs must show
that in the absence of the defendant's negligence, the child in
question would not have been born.'8 3 Because the plaintiffs
claim that the child's birth and continued existence places upon
them monetary and emotional demands, they must show that
the child would not have existed absent the defendant's negli-
gence.' 84 When plaintiffs claim the defendant negligently failed
to diagnose an impairment in utero, the only way the parents
could have avoided their damages would have been to undergo
prenatal testing and abort the fetus once they discovered the im-
pairment. Thus, to establish causation, courts require plaintiffs
to show they would have undergone prenatal testing and would
181. Negligence law traditionally has required that the plaintiffs prove the
defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiffs, the defendant breached that
duty of care, the defendant's lack of due care was the "factual cause" and "legal
cause" of plaintiffs' injuries, and the plaintiffs suffered actual damages or loss.
KEETON ET AL., supra note 6, § 30, at 164-65.
182. Tort law recognizes two types of causation, and plaintiffs must estab-
lish both in order to recover. Courts commonly refer to the first type of causa-
tion as "cause in fact" or "factual cause." The question of cause in fact requires
the fact finder to examine what would have occurred in the absence of defend-
ants lack of due care. Traditionally, plaintiffs satisfy the requirement of cause
in fact if they establish that in the absence of defendant's lack of due care, they
would not have suffered the injury or harm in question. Id. § 41, at 264-65. But
see infra notes 242-248 (discussing alternative causation tests).
Courts refer to the second type of causation that plaintiffs must establish
as "proximate cause" or "legal cause." Proximate cause or legal cause presents
the question of whether, having established a causal chain between defendant's
act and plaintiffs harm, the court should hold the defendant legally responsi-
ble. See generally id. § 42, at 272-80.
Confusion often arises between the two types of causation, in large part
because courts often combine factual cause and legal cause under the label
"proximate cause." Though the terminology used by courts in wrongful birth
cases varies, the type of causation relevant to this section is "cause in fact" or
"factual cause."
183. See supra notes 31-32.
184. Several courts have noted that because the physicians could not have
corrected the birth defects in question, the only thing they could have done was
to tell the parents about the defect before birth so they could obtain an abortion;
or in the case of a condition which could have been diagnosed before conception,
they could have avoided conception entirely. The choice, then, is not between a
healthy child and an unhealthy child, but between an unhealthy child and no
child. See, e.g., Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 13 (N.J. 1979) (noting that the
plaintiffs "do not assert that defendants increased the risk that [the child], if
born, would be afflicted with Down's Syndrome. Rather, at bottom, they allege
that they were tortiously injured because [the mother] was deprived of the op-
tion of making a meaningful decision as to whether to abort the fetus").
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have aborted the fetus, had the defendant acted with due
care.
185
Certain distorted presumptions about women's reproductive
lives underlie the causation requirement many courts and legis-
latures impose on wrongful birth plaintiffs. These presumptions
appear to be grounded in a male norm, one that assumes deci-
sion making about moral questions takes place in a certain man-
ner. The way many women make moral decisions is profoundly
different from the method courts assume, and this method of de-
cision making is inherently incompatible with the traditional
causation model employed in wrongful birth cases. This portion
185. One could make a strong argument that parents must only show they
would have aborted in order to satisfy the existing rules of causation, if they
seek damages for extraordinary caretaking expenses and for the emotional
harm of watching their child suffer from the impairments. After all, if the
plaintiffs had aborted the fetus, they would not have incurred these damages.
Yet, many courts treat the emotional harm in wrongful birth cases in part as a
denial of the choice of whether to terminate the pregnancy. See supra note 51
and infra note 190 and accompanying text. Plaintiffs do suffer some amount of
emotional harm regardless of what their choice would have been, because the
defendant robbed them of the chance to make that all-important decision for
their child and for themselves; the defendant, in a sense, made that choice for
them. This type of harm more closely resembles a harm to personal dignity and
privacy interests. Traditionally, courts have protected these types of interests
under tort law through invasion of privacy law, though none of the specific
causes of action termed "invasion of privacy" seem to fit this type of fact scena-
rio. See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 6, § 117, at 849-69; 2 FOWLER V.
HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 9.5 (2d ed. 1986) (noting that the tort of
invasion of privacy redresses offenses to personal dignity and privacy).
At least one court has acknowledged that additional emotional harm can
result from the defendant's failure to inform the parents of the impairment
before the child's birth, regardless of whether the parents would have chosen to
abort the pregnancy. In Shelton v. St. Anthony's Med. Ctr., 781 S.W.2d 48 (Mo.
1989), the court held that in spite of a state statute prohibiting any cause of
action "based on the claim that but for the negligent conduct of another, a child
would have been aborted," see Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.130(2) (Supp. 1993), the
mother could recover for emotional harm. The court recognized that because of
the defendant's negligence, the mother did not learn until the time of the child's
birth that the child carried serious physical abnormalities: the child was born
without arms and had other deformities. Shelton, 781 S.W.2d at 48. The court
held that had the defendant acted with due care, the plaintiff would have
learned before her child's birth that the child would be born with severe defor-
mities. Id. at 49. With this knowledge, the plaintiff could have prepared her-
self for the emotional trauma of giving birth to the child and could have avoided
the sudden shock of learning about her child's deformities at the time of birth.
Id. at 50.
Thus, plaintiffs can establish at least two types of emotional harm under
the existing rules of causation even in the absence of proof that the parents
would have terminated the pregnancy: the denial of the chance to choose
whether to bring the impaired child into the world and the shock of learning at
the time of birth of the child's impairment.
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of the Article will illustrate this method of moral decision mak-
ing by citing a study of women who have confronted the decision
whether to undergo prenatal testing and whether to abort an
abnormal fetus. L8 6 This study demonstrates the absence of wo-
men's voices in the law and reveals that courts and legislatures
have constructed the rules of causation in wrongful birth cases
without consideration of female voices. Because women's
method of moral decision making is inherently incompatible
with the traditional causation model, courts and legislatures
should adopt an alternative model that accounts for both the
medical negligence which contributed to the harm and the in-
herent "unknowability" of any event which might have occurred
in the absence of that negligence.' 8 7
186. My method of analysis draws in part on the suggestion of several femi-
nist scholars that we must "tell the stories" of women in order to more fully
inform the law with women's reality and women's viewpoints. "We need to flood
the market with our own stories until we get one simple point across: men's
narrative story and phenomenological description of law is not women's story
and phenomenology of law." West, supra note 142, at 65. According to one
scholar, "[t]he ostensible 'neutrality' of the law disguises the extent to which it
is premised on the perspectives of the powerful; the narratives of those who
occupy a comparatively powerless position are not only evidence of what has
been excluded, but testimony to the law's relentless perspectivity." Kathryn
Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REv. 971, 975-76 (1991) (defend-
ing use of narratives in feminist legal scholarship).
The stories of women who have had to decide whether to undergo prenatal
testing and whether to abort an impaired fetus illustrate best how difficult, if
not impossible, it is to determine in retrospect whether the parents would have
avoided the birth of their child. Some might argue that because we cannot
know what the parents would have done in the absence of the defendant's negli-
gence, the plaintiffs simply cannot establish causation, and thus, courts should
never allow recovery for wrongful birth.
But feminist method allows us to probe this question more deeply and ask
whether the problem is the claim itself, or the underlying, male-based assump-
tions which dictate how we establish the claim. I argue that the problem lies in
the male-based assumptions that underlie the rules of causation. Courts did
not construct those rules with women and their decisions regarding pregnancy
in mind. Once we remove the male norms from the causation rules, we can
examine more clearly whether the law should deter the type of negligerce al-
leged in a wrongful birth case through assessment of damages.
187. In addition, my proposal would provide a humane alternative to the
current requirement that parents declare their born child "unwanted." Strong
public policy supports eliminating this requirement in order to affirm the dig-
nity of women and men struggling with their own tragedy and to strengthen
family harmony. See infra note 202 (arguing that public policy is not served by
requiring parents to say that their child was unwanted).
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A. CASE AND STATUTORY LAW ON THE CAUSATION ELEMENT
Most courts in wrongful birth cases have required evidence
that the mother would have terminated the pregnancy, s18 but
they have not analyzed what level of proof is necessary or
whether this requirement might be detrimental to the emotional
well-being of the mother or her family. In some cases, courts
have found proof that the parents would have chosen to termi-
nate the pregnancy persuasive.' 8 9 In other cases, courts only
188. See, e.g., Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471, 477 (7th Cir. 1981)
(finding that plaintiff mother's testimony that she would have aborted preg-
nancy had she learned that she contracted rubella, along with physician's testi-
mony that he would have recommended an abortion, was sufficient to establish
causation) (applying Alabama law); Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202,
1204-05 (Colo. 1988) (holding that plaintiffs' complaint properly pled a cause of
action by alleging that had defendant exercised due care, they would have
avoided conception or terminated pregnancy); Haymon v. Wilkerson, 535 A.2d
880, 882 (D.C. 1987) (concluding that plaintiff must establish, as an element of
her claim, that had she learned of the impairment during her pregnancy, she
would have terminated the pregnancy); Goldberg v. Ruskin, 471 N.E.2d 530 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1984), affd, 499 N.E.2d 406 (III. 1986) (assuming for purposes of ap-
peal that parents' allegation that they would have sought an abortion was true);
Proffitt v. Bartolo, 412 N.W.2d 232, 237 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (concluding that
a plaintiff satisfies the causation element by showing that she would have ob-
tained an abortion in the absence of defendant's negligence); Eisbrenner v.
Stanley, 308 N.W.2d 209, 210 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (summarizing parents'
claim that had they learned of impairment during pregnancy, they would have
aborted); Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341, 343, 347 (N.H. 1986) (stating that the
chain of causation was not too remote when plaintiffs claimed that they would
have aborted the fetus had they learned of the impairment); Schroeder v.
Perkel, 432 A.2d 834, 837 (N.J. 1981) (summarizing mother's testimony that
had she learned of child's affliction during her pregnancy, she would have ob-
tained an abortion); Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 810 (N.Y. 1978) (not-
ing parents' allegation that had they learned through amniocentesis of the
abnormality, they would have terminated the pregnancy); James G. v. Caserta,
332 S.E.2d 872, 879 (W. Va. 1985) (recognizing that "[tihe underlying theory...
is that the physician or other health care provider failed to discover the birth
defect and to advise the parents so that they could intelligently decide whether
to . . . consider the termination of the pregnancy"); Dumer v. St. Michael's
Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372, 374 (Wis. 1975) (noting that plaintiffs' allegation that
the child was not aborted as a result of defendant's negligence "is apparently an
allegation that an abortion would, in fact, have been sought").
189. See, e.g., Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 512 N.E.2d 691, 693 (Ill.
1987) (noting that several members of mother's family were afflicted with he-
mophilia; mother told doctor of her desire to terminate her pregnancy if her
child was at risk for hemophilia, but defendants negligently told her that test-
ing was unnecessary); Garrison v. Medical Ctr. of Del., Inc., 581 A.2d 288, 289-
90 (Del. 1989) (summarizing parents' allegation that defendants were negligent
in delaying results of amniocentesis until third trimester; mother sought abor-
tion after she learned of child's impairment, but was unable to secure one be-
cause of advanced stage of pregnancy); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 847
(Tex. 1975) (finding that defendant failed to properly diagnose rubella early in
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have required evidence that the plaintiffs were denied the op-
portunity to abort, without proof that the parents would have
chosen that option.190 In most cases, however, the appellate
courts show little concern for how the parents might prove the
causation element once the cause of action is recognized and the
case returns to the trial level. 191
Several state legislatures have been so uncomfortable with
the causation requirement that they have adopted prohibitions
on some wrongful birth actions. x92 None of these statutes disal-
low actions in which the parents claim they would have avoided
conception altogether. 93 Thus, state legislatures do not seem
concerned with the wrongful birth cause of action as a whole. 194
mother's pregnancy despite her concerns, based on mother's testimony that had
defendant not reassured her, "I would have gone to any length to have found
out what the chances of my child were, and after having found this out, I would
have done the kindest thing that I could have known to have done for her, and
that would have been to terminate the pregnancy").
In addition, the case of Phillips v. United States, 566 F. Supp. 1 (D.S.C.
1981), is one of the few reported decisions of a trial court as fact finder. In the
judge's findings of fact which followed the bench trial, the court addressed in
detail the mother's testimony that she would have sought an abortion, and the
defense's attempts to discredit that testimony. The court viewed the parents'
testimony on the subject as "determinative," despite the defense's attempts to
discredit their statements by "eliciting testimony concerning their love for the
afflicted child, their desire to keep the child and not place him for adoption,
possible moral or religious objections to abortion, and Mrs. Phillips's decision to
undergo a tubal ligation rather than risk the necessity of future abortion." Id.
at 4-5 (citations to record omitted).
190. See, e.g., Walker v. Mart, 790 P.2d 735, 738 (Ariz. 1990) (holding that
parents may recover "if parents establish that a physician's negligence pre-
vented them from exercising their right of choice to terminate the pregnancy");
Arche v. United States, 798 P.2d 477, 480 (Kan. 1990) ("We assume that plain-
tiff Nicole Arche was denied her right to make an informed decision whether or
not to seek an abortion.").
191. A defendant could attempt to disprove plaintiffs' claim that they would
have terminated the pregnancy, and past experience suggests that attempts by
aggressive counsel may be harsh and even outside the bounds of common de-
cency. See, e.g., Phillips, 566 F. Supp. at 4-5 (finding defense counsel's attempt
to disprove plaintiffs' claim with testimony regarding plaintiffs' love for their
child and religious convictions "neither persuasive nor germane").
192. See supra note 33.
193. See supra note 33.
194. Moreover, few legislatures seem concerned with other issues, such as
the difficulty of measuring damages, which have caused some courts to deny
recognition of the wrongful birth claim. See, e.g., Atlanta Obstetrics & Gynecol-
ogy Group v. Abelson, 398 S.E.2d 557, 561-62 (Ga. 1990) (finding traditional
rules regarding tort damages difficult to apply in wrongful birth cases); Az-
zolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528, 535-36 (N.C. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
835 (1986) (finding measure of damages difficult to determine in wrongful birth
cases).
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Instead, the statutes only prohibit actions in which plaintiffs
must show they would have aborted the pregnancy had they
learned of an impairment. 195
Several courts that have refused to allow the wrongful birth
cause of action also have expressed concern about the difficulty
of proving causation. For instance, in Azzolino v. Dingfelder,196
the North Carolina Supreme Court denied recognition of the
cause of action, expressing doubt that wrongful birth plaintiffs
could establish causation:
[T]he wrongful birth claim will almost always hinge upon testimony
given by the parents after the birth concerning their desire prior to the
birth to terminate the fetus should it be defective. The temptation will
be great for parents, if not to invent such a prior desire to abort, to at
least deny the possibility that they might have changed their minds
and allowed the child to be born even if they had known of the defects
it would suffer.1 9
7
Similarly, in Wilson v. Kuenzi,198 the Missouri Supreme Court
rejected the cause of action for wrongful birth and expounded on
the difficulty of proving causation with any degree of certainty:
In the wrongful birth action, the right to recovery is based solely on the
woman testifying, long after the fact and when it is in her financial
interest to do so, that she would have chosen to abort if the physician
had but told her of the amniocentesis test. The percentage of women
who under pressure refuse to consider abortion, whether for reasons of
195. For example, Idaho's statute states in part that "[a] cause of action
shall not arise, and damages shall not be awarded, on behalf of any person,
based on the claim that but for the act or omission of another, a person would
not have been permitted to have been born alive but would have been aborted."
IDAHO CODE § 5-334(1) (1992). Legislatures in Minnesota, Missouri, Penn-
sylvania, and Utah have adopted statutes that contain similar language. See
supra note 33.
The Idaho legislature adopted its wrongful birth statute following a deci-
sion by the Idaho Supreme Court to recognize the cause of action. Like most
decisions recognizing wrongful birth claims, the decision showed little concern
for the ramifications of the causation element. See Blake v. Cruz, 698 P.2d 315,
319-20 (Idaho 1984) (arguing that "the element of [causation] does not present
an obstacle to the wrongful birth analysis, assuming that the parents allege and
show that, but for the physician's negligence, they would have terminated the
pregnancy..., and therefore no child would have been born"). Only six months
after the Idaho Supreme Court announced the Blake decision, the Idaho legisla-
ture adopted IDAHO CODE § 5-334.
196. 337 S.E.2d 528 (N.C. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 835 (1986).
197. Id. at 535.
198. 751 S.W.2d 741 (Mo. 1988), cert. denied 488 U.S. 893 (1988). Although
Missouri has barred some wrongful birth claims by statute, see supra note 33,
the claim in Wilson accrued before passage of that statute. After determining
that the legislature did not intend the statute to operate retroactively, Wilson,
751 S.W.2d at 742, the court concluded that even under Missouri common law,
the parents had no viable cause of action, id. at 745-46.
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religious belief, strong motherly instincts, or for other reasons, is some-
times astounding. It would seem that testimony either more verifiable
based upon experience or more verifiable by some objective standard
should be required as the basis for any action for substantial
damages. 1 9
9
The Georgia Supreme Court also has refused to recognize the
cause of action,200  citing concern with the element of
causation.20 '
The Azzolino and Wilson courts seem concerned primarily
with the woman who might "falsely" claim under oath that she
would have chosen an abortion. In contrast, courts ignore the
difficulty the woman may have in determining for herself what
she would have done had she known of the impairment. Nota-
bly, the cases do reveal the problems with imposing such an odd
requirement on a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action.20 2
B. A FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF COURTs' REQUIREMENT THAT
PLAINTIFF PROVE SHE WOULD HAVE CHOSEN
ABORTION
Although courts should not deny recognition of the wrongful
birth cause of action because of the causation difficulties, 20 3 it is
199. Id.
200. Atlanta Obstetrics & Gynecology Group v. Abelson, 398 S.E.2d 557, 560
(Ga. 1990).
201. Id. at 561. The court actually seemed more concerned with the fact
that the defendant did not cause the child's impairment. This argument mis-
characterizes the wrongful birth claim; plaintiffs do not claim the defendant
caused the impairment, but instead they claim the defendant caused the par-
ents to carry the pregnancy to term. See supra note 184.
202. One of the dissenters in Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 512 N.E.2d
691 (Ill. 1987), may have stated another, more realistic concern with this
requirement:
One cannot pass over how painful to parents and child alike an action
by parents [for wrongful birth] must be. Parents will show that they
did not want the child in his condition and that he would have been
aborted had it not been for the professional inattentiveness of a physi-
cian or other medical person. Had they known, he never would have
been. It is public policy obviously to encourage love and harmony in
family relationships. Public policy which in importance transcends in-
dividual disputes will hardly be served by lawsuits of this character.
Id. at 709 (Ward, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
203. I suspect that in some of the states that have restricted wrongful birth
claims by statute, the main concern of legislatures has not been with the bur-
den imposed upon the woman plaintiff in deciding after the fact how she would
have resolved this difficult moral problem. Instead, these legislatures seem far
more concerned with expressing their disapproval of abortion in any way they
can. Several of the states which restrict wrongful birth claims by statute also
have enacted restrictive abortion legislation since the Supreme Court decided
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 144.343 (1989) (re-
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important to address these concerns in order to strive for a more
acceptable framework for the cause of action. The problem does
not lie in the premise of the cause of action itself-that a physi-
cian's negligence has at least in part contributed to a severe fi-
nancial and emotional burden on a family-or in some threat
that plaintiffs will make false claims under oath in order to col-
lect damages. Instead, the problem lies in the strict rules of cau-
sation themselves; they are incapable of accounting for the
complexities of the abortion decision.
The rules assume a male method of moral decision making
and so naturally have failed to account for female decision-mak-
ing methods in what is a uniquely female experience. Two dis-
tortions are present in the case law: courts assume that
mothers reach the decision to abort an impaired fetus by exam-
ining abstract moral principles, and courts assume that the deci-
sion to abort is easy because this type of abortion is more
"acceptable."
1. The Current Application of Causation Rules in Wrongful
Birth Cases Distorts Women's Experiences
a. Courts Wrongly Assume that the Decision to Abort is Based
on Abstract Principles, and Therefore Is Easy to
Determine After the Fact.
In using the traditional test for causation, courts deciding
wrongful birth cases have failed to acknowledge the complexities
of uniquely female experiences: pregnancy, prenatal testing,
and abortion. Typically, courts reason that if the physician or
other medical professional had not been negligent, the parents
would have chosen to undergo the testing in question, learned of
the fetal defect, aborted the fetus, and thus avoided the damages
they now seek.204 Such a formulation, however, reduces the
abortion decision to a "yes-or-no," detached, and objective deci-
sion that must flow directly from the knowledge gained from the
fetal testing. The formulation also ignores the fact that a deci-
sion to undergo fetal testing itself may be a harrowing one that
quiring parental notification); Mo. REv. STAT. § 1.205 (1986) (declaring that life
begins at conception); Mo. REv. STAT. § 188.010 (1986) (prohibiting use of public
facilities or employees for abortions); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3203 (1992)
(requiring waiting period, informed consent, and parental consent before ob-
taining abortion); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-304 (1990) (requiring parental notifi-
cation); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-302 (1992) (allowing abortion after 20 weeks of
gestation only in the case of rape, incest, grave defect, or threat to the life of the
mother).
204. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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hinges in large part on moral concerns. Thus, the rule assumes
that a decision in retrospect is possible: if the woman is morally
"opposed" to abortion, she would not have undergone the test or
terminated the pregnancy, but if she is not morally "opposed" to
abortion, she would have undergone the test and terminated the
pregnancy. This assumption denigrates the abortion decision by
simplifying it and minimizing the host of considerations which
may affect it.205 It also assumes a male method of decision mak-
ing in which abstract principles control.20 6
i. Gilligan's Study of Moral Decision Making.
A study conducted by Carol Gilligan in preparing her influ-
ential book, In A Different Voice,207 illustrates the complexities
of the abortion decision. Gilligan interviewed twenty-nine wo-
men who were considering whether to abort and used the results
of her study to demonstrate the gendered nature of moral deci-
sion making.208 She concluded that women make moral deci-
sions 20 9 in a manner remarkably different from the methods
205. The degree of emotional detachment courts assume seems more akin to
that exercised when deciding whether to mitigate one's damages in the face of a
breach of contract. Compare the statement "Because A has refused to sell me
the widgets at $1 each as promised, shall I buy the widgets from B at $2 each
and try to collect the difference?" with "Because my unborn child is carrying a
defect, shall I abort and try again?" This example illustrates the inadequacy of
the traditional causation analysis; it requires behavior of expectant parents
that is more like that of businesspersons.
206. "[A]bortion ethics could be argued to be masculinist where the answer
to a question about abortion is seen to hinge on the abstract proposition of
whether a clump of cells is indeed human." Lynn T. Shepler, M.D., Values,
Gender, and the Abortion Question: A Feminist Perspective, in PSYCHIATRIC As.
PECTS OF ABORTION 75, 79 (Nada L. Stotland, M.D. ed., 1991).
207. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982).
208. Id. at 73-105. Gilligan's research may not fully reflect the way in which
women make moral decisions. The group of women Gilligan interviewed all had
visited an abortion clinic and were at least considering having an abortion. Be-
cause her study only included women who were considering an abortion, it nec-
essarily excluded any women who concluded after abstract analysis that
abortion is "morally wrong." Presumably, these women never would have vis-
ited an abortion clinic, nor would they have considered an abortion. Thus, they
would not have become a part of Gilligan's study, and their method of decision
making therefore is not reflected in her results. Accordingly, although Gilli-
gan's study reveals a method of moral decision making that is not apparent
from studies of male decision making, it does not establish that all women or
even that the majority of women make moral decisions in the contextual man-
ner which Gilligan illustrates.
209. Gilligan's interviews focused on how the women reached the decision
whether to abort, especially on how they considered the moral dimensions of
that decision.
898
1994] WRONGFUL BIRTH
used by men.210 While men think about moral questions by ex-
amining abstract ideals, women are more concerned with con-
textual and relational issues raised by moral problems.211 Thus,
in the abortion context, a man might think about whether a fe-
tus is a "person,"212 while a woman would consider the feelings
and interests of all those who might be affected by her decision,
including her partner, her unborn child, other children or family
members, and herself.213
Accordingly, the question in a wrongful birth case becomes
much more complicated than simply whether the woman is
"morally opposed" to abortion. The woman's decision invariably
would have been bound up in the competing and complementary
interests of those around her.2 14 And in the wrongful birth con-
text, of course, the woman's decision is made in hindsight, be-
cause her physician's negligence denied her the opportunity to
210. Many have misunderstood Gilligan; she does not claim that all women
think differently than all men, but rather that there are two distinctly different
ways of thinking about moral questions. Gilligan discovered that the relational
and contextual method of deciding moral issues was more prevalent in the wo-
men in her study. GILLIGAN, supra note 207, at 24-63. Gilligan concluded that
while psychologists and sociologists had asserted that women and girls gener-
ally were not as morally developed as men and boys, the standards they used
for supporting that assertion were developed in psychological studies of men
and boys only. Id. at 5-23. Since those studies did not include women and girls,
the standards developed were gender-biased, and failed to take account of the
different, but valid, methods of thinking about moral questions more prevalent
among women and girls. Id.
211. Id. at 73-105.
212. If courts used this method of moral reasoning, they could resolve the
causation problem in a wrongful birth case simply by determining the abstract
ideal held by the plaintiff. If the plaintiff were "morally opposed" to abortion,
then she would not have chosen abortion and cannot prove causation. If the
plaintiff were not "morally opposed" to abortion, however, then she would have
chosen abortion and therefore can establish causation.
213. GiLLIGAN, supra note 207, at 73.
214. Gilligan posits that women resolve moral dilemmas not by choosing one
moral principle over another, but rather by finding a balance among all of the
conflicting responsibilities they face-to themselves, to the unborn child, to a
partner, to other children, and to family members. Women find a "morality of
mutual care" which allows them simultaneously to balance all responsibilities
and minimize hurt to others and to themselves. Id. at 73-105. Thus, a woman
considering whether to abort a fetus carrying birth defects might resolve that
an abortion is the most moral thing to do. Among the "hurts" she would try to
minimize would be the financial and emotional strain the child would impose
upon her, her partner, and other family members, and the emotional and physi-
cal pain the child might suffer because of the defect. The woman might regard
her desire to have the child, despite the pain that child would suffer, as a selfish
one that she should balance against the hurts to be avoided. See infra notes
215-231 and accompanying text (illustrating the moral decision making process
of women considering whether to abort because of fetal abnormalities).
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consider all of these factors and reach a decision she felt would
be best for all. It is no wonder that this seems an impossible
task. Yet this is what a wrongful birth plaintiff must prove in
order to establish her right to damages under the traditional
rule of causation. The decision is just not as simple as tradi-
tional causation presumes.
ii. Gilligan's Conclusions Ilustrated: Rothman's Study of
Women and Prenatal Testing.
After interviewing genetic counselors and their patients,
Barbara Katz Rothman discovered that when deciding whether
to undergo prenatal testing or to abort an abnormal fetus, a wo-
man considers many intangible factors. 215 The decision to un-
dergo prenatal testing is itself a difficult one for many women.
Some women, even those who have had previous abortions,
choose to forego testing:
This was a child that when we started the child, we wanted the child.
The year before I had an abortion. The second child had colic, was
difficult. They would have been too close together. We decided to have
an abortion. It wasn't terrible, but it wasn't a pleasant experience. We
hadn't planned that to be a child, but this one was planned to be a
child. It seemed wrong to reject it because it was damaged. 2 16
In addition, the process of prenatal testing itself can add further
complexity to any abortion decision the woman might have to
make:
I was not sure that I would be able to go through with an abortion and
I am still not sure what I would have done if [an abnormality had been
found). During the procedure I saw my baby very clearly on the so-
nogram and I saw her move her arms and fingers. Then before the
results came in, I felt the movements. Those two factors made me very
attached to her, much more than before the amniocentesis. Also know-
ing her sex made her so much more like a real person. 217
Another woman made the following observation about prenatal
testing and its effect on her perception of the pregnancy:
It was easy to say at the beginning of the pregnancy that I would have
an abortion. However, as part of the [amniocentesis] procedure an ul-
215. For her book The Tentative Pregnancy, Barbara Katz Rothman inter-
viewed genetic counselors and the women who were their patients. RoTimAN,
supra note 141, at 15. All of these women saw the counselors during pregnancy.
Id. at 17. Rothman spoke both with women who had decided to undergo amni-
ocentesis and with those who had decided to continue their pregnancies without
recommended testing. Id. She also spoke with women who had learned
through amniocentesis that their fetuses carried some genetic defect. Id. at 18.
The quotations from her book which follow are excerpts from those interviews.
216. Id. at 69.
217. Id. at 58.
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trasound is done. We could see the baby and she became real to us.
After that it was extremely difficult to think of abortion.... The proce-
dure is performed so late and the pregnancy is advanced enough that
abortion is not a simple matter. It seems more like murder.2
1 8
Other women, who before testing believed they would not
have terminated their pregnancies, felt differently once they
learned the results of the tests. One of the women Rothman in-
terviewed made the following statement after her amniocentesis
but before she received the results:
So what made us [have an amniocentesis]?... [Ilt was those nice com-
petent people sitting there saying, "we can see if there's a Downs baby
in there, and if there is, we'll help get rid of it." That was a tempting
plum-ugly, distorted, perverse, but still, to be assured that our lives
won't be disrupted by that, was too tempting not to pluck. It feels like
an ignoble choice, a choice offered by the devil himself. Pardon my
lapse into the biblical, but the whole thing made me sick, the deliber-
ate vote of no, baby, if you are a Mongol, death to you, no right to exist.
I see these children occasionally-what's so terrible? That's while
they're children, and no, I've not forgotten about growing old with a
handicapped adult child to care for. It's truly your right but it's got a
moral stink to it that sickens me.2 19
This same woman learned three weeks later that her child car-
ried Down's Syndrome, and she terminated the pregnancy.220
Another woman Rothman interviewed learned through amni-
ocentesis that her unborn daughter carried Trisomy X.221 After
researching the limited information on Trisomy X, the woman
decided to terminate the pregnancy:
I never would have thought that I'd have done that. If someone told
me I'd have aborted a child that didn't have a severe thing, I'd have
said no, never.... I guess I'll deal with it the rest of my life. Not
guilty, but it will be an issue. I don't know whether it was right or
wrong, just what I had to do.2 2 2
At the time of their tests, most of Rothman's subjects were
uncertain what they would do if amniocentesis revealed an
abnormality:
I would want to know if there were any defects. I don't know whether I
would choose to abort-the concrete facts of the situation would come
218. Id. at 58-59 (omission in original).
219. Id. at 62.
220. Id.
221. Trisomy X is a condition in which a female carries three X chromo-
somes instead of the normal two X chromosomes. OxFoRD's, supra note 16, at
1393 (defining "Trisomy"); RoTmMAN, supra note 141, at 166. Researchers have
shown no definitive link between this chromosomal condition and any physical
or mental disorder. Some evidence suggests, however, that those with Trisomy
X will be sterile, while other evidence shows a possible link between Trisomy X
and mental retardation or schizophrenia. Id. at 166-67.
222. RoTmiA, supra note 141, at 168 (omission in original).
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into play and so would my feelings... it depends on when I'd have
learned of it [the defect] and what kind of information I obtained. The
potential suffering of the child would have to be figured into a decision
too.
2 2 3
Most women had to revisit the issue of whether to abort after a
bad diagnosis. In some cases, this was because the women were
pressured into the amniocentesis in the first place. 224 Other wo-
men purposefully postponed consideration of the moral question
until they received the test results. 2 2 5 Some expected that they
would abort if they received a bad diagnosis, but they felt less
certain of their initial decision once the diagnosis arrived.226
Still others learned the fetus carried an unexpected condition.227
An overwhelming percentage of the women to whom Roth-
man spoke who eventually learned that their children carried
abnormalities chose to abort their pregnancies. 228 Even those
women who terminated their pregnancies remained uncertain
whether the choice was more or less difficult than carrying the
child to term and they recognized that they could never resolve
this question for certain. A woman whose unborn child carried
Trisomy 18229 and spina bifida230 made the following statement
after her abortion:
In retrospect, I have wondered if it might have been easier on me just
to carry the pregnancy to term and lose the child that way. I think
emotionally it might have been-well, that's guessing. Maybe it would
just have dragged it out for a longer time and made it just as hard if
not harder, for a longer period. Yeah, this was a real person to me, and
223. Id. at 82 (omission in original).
224. "[Women] sometimes give in [to pressure to have an amniocentesis] be-
cause the chances of a bad diagnosis are so remote that it is easier to go along
with it than to argue with husband or doctor." Id. at 181.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. For instance, many women believe they know what they would do if
they learned their child carried a fatal condition such as Tay Sachs syndrome,
but when they learn their child carries some unexpected condition like Trisomy
X, they must decide anew whether to continue the pregnancy. ROTHMAN, supra
note 141, at 181-82.
228. Id. at 181.
229. Trisomy 18 is "a condition characterized by mental retardation,
scaphocephaly or other skull abnormality, micrognathia, blepharoptosis, low-
set ears, corneal opacities, deafness, webbed neck, short digits, ventricular sep-
tal defects, Meckel's diverticulum, and other deformities. It is due to the pres-
ence of an extra chromosome 18." DoRLAN's, supra note 63, at 1645-46.
230. Spina bifida is "a developmental anomaly characterized by defective
closure of the bony encasement of the spinal cord, through which the cord and
meninges may... or may not... protrude." Id. at 1560.
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all the rationalizing in the world is not going to change my feeling. But
my husband doesn't consider that the baby was a person.
2 3 1
b. Courts Wrongly Assume that the Decision to Terminate a
Pregnancy Because of Fetal Impairment Is Less
Difficult than the Decision to Terminate for
Other Reasons.
In deciding wrongful birth cases, courts generally assume
that the decision to abort because of a fetal abnormality is some-
how "easier" than the decision to abort for another reason,232
noting that abortions performed because of a fetal abnormality
are more socially acceptable.233 This assumption is inaccurate,
however, and does not reflect women's actual experiences. By
the time a diagnosis of a fetal abnormality is made, the woman
often is well along in her pregnancy; she may have in fact al-
ready felt the fetus move. According to one woman, "by the time
the results came in the baby had been leaping in my womb for a
month.... During one of the sleepless nights before the results
were in I decided I would raise the child if it looked like E.T."234
If the woman otherwise desires the pregnancy, moreover, she is
more likely to think of the fetus as her "baby" than would a wo-
man who becomes pregnant by accident:
If a woman sees a pregnancy as an accident-if, for example, her preg-
nancy is a by-product of contraception that did not work-then in her
definition the fetus is not a person and not meant to be one. The abor-
tion is the solution to the problem of failed contraception.
But if the fetus is to be her child, if she has chosen to have this
baby-chosen by consciously and purposively becoming pregnant, or by
willingly and openly accepting an unintended pregnancy-then she
considers that fetus to be a person. It is her baby.
... [Prenatal diagnosis] sets up a contradiction in definitions. It
asks women to accept their pregnancies and their babies, to take care
of the babies within them, and yet be willing to abort them. We ask
them to think about the needs of the coming baby, to fantasize about
231. ROTHmAN, supra note 141, at 183.
232. Among all the wrongful birth cases, only one court has acknowledged
that the decision to abort under these circumstances might be difficult. See
Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 646 P.2d 483, 491 (Wash. 1983) (en banc) ("Par-
ents may avoid the birth of [a] defective child by aborting the fetus. The diffi-
cult moral choice is theirs.").
233. More than 80% of Americans approve of abortion in the case of a fetal
abnormality. RoTmmiN, supra note 141, at 5 (citing 1984 New York Times-CBS
poll).
234. Id. at 7 (omission in original) (citing Meredith B. Burke and Aliza
Kolker, Amniocentesis and the Social Construction of Pregnancy (1982) (Paper
presented to the annual meeting of the District of Columbia Sociological Soci-
ety, Baltimore, Maryland)).
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the baby, to begin to become the mother of the baby, and yet to be
willing to abort the genetically damaged fetus. At the same time. For
twenty to twenty-four weeks.
23 5
Nonetheless, the language courts use to discuss the causation
requirement seems to assume that the decision to abort an ab-
normal fetus always is a simple one, 23 6 at least for women who
are not "morally opposed" to abortion. The reality of women's
experiences, however, is that the decision is complex and diffi-
cult. Women who have been through the experience express
surprise at feelings they never would have imagined or pre-
dicted. Accordingly, judges and juries cannot expect women to
know how they would have felt were they presented with the
choice.
2. Patriarchal Interests Served by the Current
Characterization of Causation Requirements in
Wrongful Birth Cases
State legislatures that prohibit wrongful birth claims in
which the plaintiffs allege they would have aborted reinforce pa-
triarchy in two ways: by denying women recovery for harm that
has resulted at least in part from another's negligence and by
signalling to women and men that the decision to abort in the
case of a fetal abnormality is not acceptable. 237 Courts that re-
235. Id. at 5-6.
236. The assumption that the abortion choice will be easier in the case of a
fetal abnormality also has the potential for robbing women of the choice not to
abort upon finding a fetal abnormality. When courts assume that a woman
confronted with the decision will always choose to abort, they take choice away.
Abortion becomes the expected choice, and the only acceptable choice.
Rothman argues that the availability of contraception and the right to con-
trol the size of one's family already has led to similar pressures. Once women
gained the right to control the size of their families through use of contracep-
tion, society soon began to expect them to use birth control for this purpose.
RoTnmAN, supra note 141, at 11-13. Thus, this expectation foreclosed the op-
tion of choosing a large family. Society looks down on women who choose to
have large families-to not control their fertility. Id. North American society is
now structured around small families, as evidenced by car sizes and apartment
sizes, for example. Id. at 13. Rothman expresses the fear that with the availa-
bility of prenatal diagnosis and abortion, society will expect women to undergo
prenatal testing as a routine matter and abort any abnormal fetuses. Id. at 13-
15. Others will look down on women who give birth to children with Down's
Syndrome, for instance, and society will become even more structured around
the assumption that all of its members are physically healthy and mentally
capable. Id.
237. Statutes that prohibit a cause of action based on a claim that, in the
absence of defendant's negligence, a pregnancy would have been terminated,
send a message to at least two groups: those who have learned that their un-
born child is impaired, and are considering termination, and those who are the
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fuse to recognize the cause of action because of a problem with
causation send the same message. Courts that recognize the
claim, yet establish a burdensome causation requirement, may
do the most damage: plaintiffs in these cases are left to the
mercy of aggressive defense counsel,238 and must prove to a
judge or jury that, despite any mixed feelings they may have
now or might have had at the time, they would have aborted
their (now born) child.
Not only do these courts impose a heavy emotional price
upon women and men who seek relief from the defendant's neg-
ligence, but they also avoid having to address any difficult moral
dilemma themselves. Women's actual experiences illustrate
that the decision to abort an impaired fetus is one of the most
difficult any human being ever will have to make. Moreover,
few women know with certainty what choice they would make
until actually confronted with the decision. It is therefore
nearly impossible to make the decision in hindsight. Instead of
confronting this reality and acknowledging the burden the cau-
sation rule places upon women-the burden of deciding what
one would do after giving birth to the child and caring for it-the
courts take the easy way out and conclude that "[t]he difficult
moral choice" belongs to the parents.239 Thus, courts and the
rest of us do not have to struggle with these difficult moral di-
lemmas. Once again, the decision becomes a private one.240
3. Legal Reforms and Other Suggestions for More Ideal
Circumstances for Women
In order to deter the type of medical malpractice at issue in
wrongful birth cases and protect future parents from the emo-
tional and financial burden to which this type of negligence
leads, courts should reformulate the causation requirement. As
it now stands, future parents in seven states have little protec-
victims of medical negligence and have learned only after their child's birth
that an abortion could have been chosen. The message sent to both groups is
that abortion (or a desire that one could have been obtained in the past) is not a
proper or acceptable response.
. 238. See Phillips v. United States, 566 F. Supp. 1, 4-5 (D.S.C. 1981) (describ-
ing cross-examination by defense counsel on causation issue by questioning
plaintiffs love for her child, her moral view on abortion, and her failure to give
her child up for adoption).
239. Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 491 (Wash. 1983) (en
banc).
240. Feminist legal theorists argue that the law tends to privatize women's
concerns, and so place them beyond the reach of the law. See Gavison, supra
note 172.
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tion against this type of malpractice; their tort systems provide
no deterrence against this kind of negligence. 24' Even those fu-
ture parents who have some protection against negligence may
face an emotional nightmare if they are the victims of negligence
and seek compensation as a result.
Fortunately, traditional causation rules are not written in
stone. In many contexts, courts have modified the traditional
causation rules in order to further some important policy inter-
est.242 In cases involving "concurrent causes,"243 for instance,
most courts have abandoned the traditional causation require-
ment in favor of a "substantial factor" test.244 In the absence of
this formulation, negligent actors would not be held liable, even
when the lack of due care is apparent. In addition, courts have
shifted the burden of proof in cases in which it has been particu-
larly difficult for plaintiffs to prove causation.245 When plain-
tiffs have been unable to establish the identity of the defendant,
courts also have adopted a "market share" theory of causation in
order to ensure that as against an industry which manufactured
a defective drug,24 6 an innocent plaintiff will not go uncompen-
241. Georgia, Idaho, Minnesota, Missouri, North Carolina, Pennsylvania,
and Utah prohibit some or all wrongful birth actions. See supra notes 2 & 33.
242. See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 6, § 41, at 266-68 (discussing
different concepts of causation).
243. In cases involving concurrent causes, two independent acts of negli-
gence converge to cause one harm. Id. § 41, at 266-67. Either cause standing
alone would have been sufficient to cause the harm. Id. The traditional test of
causation fails under these circumstances because but for the negligence of one
actor, the plaintiff still would have suffered damages; the other actor's negli-
gence alone would have caused the harm. Id. Thus, the traditional test ab-
solves both negligent actors of liability.
244. Id. § 41, at 267-68. The substantial factor test holds a negligent actor
liable where that actor's negligence, standing alone, would have been sufficient
to cause the plaintiffs damages, even if another actor's negligence also would
have been sufficient alone to cause the harm. Id.
245. Id. § 41, at 270-72. The prototypical case is Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d
1 (Cal. 1948). In Summers, two defendants negligently shot in the direction of
the plaintiff, and one of the shots hit and injured the plaintiff. Id. at 1-2. The
plaintiff, unable to establish which of the two defendants fired the shot that hit
him, failed to meet his burden of proof for establishing causation under the
traditional test. The California Supreme Court held that under these circum-
stances, in which the plaintiff clearly established the negligence of both actors,
the burden of proof should shift to the defendants, who each must establish that
the shot they fired did not hit the plaintiff. Id. at 4. Most courts now generally
accept this rule. KEETON ET AL., supra note 6, § 41, at 271.
246. The first case to apply the market share theory was a product liability
suit brought by a woman injured as a result of her mother's ingestion of the
drug DES during pregnancy. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924
(Cal. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). The plaintiff, unable to determine
the manufacturer of the drug her mother ingested, sued several manufacturers
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sated.247 A strong policy consideration underlies all of these de-
cisions: when the choice is between imposing the loss on an
innocent plaintiff or on culpable defendants, the defendants
should carry the loSS. 248
A closer examination of the problems presented by the
traditional causation rule in wrongful birth cases reveals strong
policy reasons for altering that rule as well. The decision
whether to undergo prenatal testing is usually difficult, and the
decision whether to abort an impaired fetus is almost always
painful. Women who have been through the experience report
that they could not have known their decision until they were
confronted with the choice.249 Thus, in almost all wrongful birth
cases, courts simply cannot know what a woman would have
done had she been faced with the decision. This uncertainty is
not because of any failure on the woman's part. Instead, it is the
kind of "fact" that simply is unknowable given human nature
and women's methods of decision making. If a plaintiff can es-
tablish clearly that the defendant fell below the applicable stan-
dard of care, she should recover. Like other cases in which
courts have altered the causation rules, the choice here is be-
tween a clearly culpable defendant, who at least contributed in
some way to the plaintiffs damages, and a clearly innocent
plaintiff.250
Courts could effectively change the causation rules in one of
several ways. For instance, courts could impose liability if the
plaintiff shows that the defendant's negligence was "a contribut-
ing cause" of the plaintiffs damages. Under such a formulation,
courts would not require a plaintiff to prove that she would have
terminated her pregnancy. Instead, courts would only require a
plaintiff to show that the defendant's negligence was one signifi-
cant occurrence which did lead to the birth of the child in ques-
tion. In the alternative, courts could impose liability through
use of a presumption that in the absence of the defendant's neg-
ligence, the plaintiff would have undergone the testing and ter-
of the drug. Id. at 925-26. The court held that, in the absence of proof that they
had not manufactured the drug in question, each defendant would be held lia-
ble for a portion of the plaintiffs damages. Id. at 937. The portion for which
each defendant was held liable corresponded to that defendant's "market share"
of the DES market during the time plaintiffs mother took the drug. Id. at 936-
37. Courts have applied this theory in other types of product liability cases,
including asbestos cases. KEETON ET AL., supra note 6, § 103, at 713-14.
247. KEETON Er AL., supra note 6, § 41, at 271-72.
248. Id. § 41, at 271.
249. See supra notes 215-231 and accompanying text.
250. See supra note 248.
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minated the pregnancy. 251 This alternative is less attractive,
though, due to tactics which aggressive defense counsel might
pursue in order to rebut the presumption.252
Alternatively, state legislatures might establish a scheme in
which wrongful birth plaintiffs who wish to avoid the emotional
demands placed upon them by the traditional causation rule
could opt for a lesser burden of proof (e.g., that the defendant's
negligence contributed to the birth of the child). The statute
might cap damages for emotional harm and extraordinary care-
taking expenses at some reasonable amount, as a trade-off for
application of the more favorable causation rule.
Any of these proposals would improve women's lives by rec-
ognizing the realities of women's experiences, especially the
complexities involved in decisions regarding pregnancy and
abortion. In addition, the reforms would make it more likely
that women and men in wrongful birth cases could recover com-
pensation necessary to care for their impaired children.
Recovery of damages would not be as necessary, though, if
more resources were available to families to care for physically
or mentally impaired children. Women and men would not need
to bring suit, putting themselves and their families through
enormous financial and emotional strain, if other financial re-
sources necessary to care for their children were available. Un-
til our society provides the kind of financial support these
families need, however, wrongful birth suits will be necessary.
Furthermore, proper medical care could avoid many of the
tragedies revealed by wrongful birth cases. Some of the birth
defects at issue in these cases did not result from genetic abnor-
malities. Instead, they occurred early in pregnancy because the
women in question did not receive proper medical care before
and during their pregnancies. Appropriate medical care could
effectively avoid these defects in the future. For example, vacci-
nation of women before they become pregnant could easily pre-
vent the birth of children with rubella syndrome. 25 3 Ideally, all
251. On the basis of Rothman's study, this presumption seems well-
grounded in fact, because nearly all of the women with whom she spoke termi-
nated their pregnancies once they learned of a fetal abnormality. See supra
note 228 and accompanying text. The presumption that a woman would have
chosen to undergo the prenatal testing, however, is less supportable. Rothman
talked with many women who decided to forego prenatal testing. See supra
note 216 and accompanying text.
252. See, e.g., Phillips v. United States, 566 F. Supp. 1, 4-5 (D.S.C. 1981)
(describing aggressive questioning by defense counsel).
253. See Craig C. White et al., Benefits, Rises and Costs of Immunization for
Measles, Mumps and Rubella, 75 AM. I. PuB. HEALTH 739, 739-40 (1985) (stat-
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women would receive adequate health care before and during
their pregnancies (and throughout their lives), reducing the
number of women faced with pregnancies they feel they must
terminate or wish they would have terminated.
CONCLUSION
By using male norms, courts and legislatures have distorted
women's experiences of pregnancy, motherhood, and abortion,
especially as those experiences affect women whose unborn or
born children are physically or mentally impaired. By replacing
the male norm with a female norm, the law of wrongful birth
will more accurately reflect the reality of these cases. As a re-
sult, courts will struggle less with attempts to fit the existing
rules to the facts of wrongful birth cases, and states will reach
greater consensus on these issues.
Undoubtedly, male norms presented as objective standards
lurk beneath other seemingly innocuous issues of law. This Ar-
ticle has examined some male norms, but may have ignored
others within the law of wrongful birth and tort. Hopefully,
through this Article, the reader will gain greater awareness of
potential male norms within the law and will work to eliminate
them.
ing that vaccination programs have prevented approximatedly 1.5 million ru-
bella cases).
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